Request By:
Mr. John W. Craig
Executive Director
Kentucky Registry of
Election Finance
1520 Louisville Road
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of January 12 in which you, on behalf of the Registry, seek an interpretation of the provisions of KRS 121.045, particularly, the first sentence as it may apply to the following questions that were submitted by the Syliva Watson Committee:
"1. Does this statute prevent an employee of county government from contributing money, service, or other thing of value to the campaign of a candidate for County Commissioner?
"2. Does this statute prevent a department head in county government from contributing money, service or other thing of value to the campaign of a candidate for County Commissioner?
"3. Does this statute prevent an attorney who practices cases before Fiscal Court from contributing money, service or other thing of value to the campaign of a County Commissioner?
"4. Does this statute prohibit a citizen of Jefferson County whose affairs are 'supervised, regulated, or controlled in any manner' from contributing to the campaign of a candidate for County Commissioner? What is meant by the quoted phrase?"
The first sentence of KRS 121.045 reads:
"No person other than a corporation, and no agent of such person on his behalf, shall contribute, either directly or indirectly, any money, service or other thing of value towards the nomination or election of any state, county, city or district officer who, in his official capacity, is required by law to perform any duties peculiar to such person not common to the general public, or to supervise, regulate or control in any manner the affairs of such person, or to perform any duty in assessing the property of such person for taxation. . . ."
The above excerpt of the statute appears to be made up of separable parts. We find only two cases construing this statute.
The initial case was that of Hatcher v. Petry, 261 Ky. 52, 86 S.W.2d 1043 (1935). Petry was president of the local union of the United Mine Workers of America and at the same time a candidate for state representative. The local union contributed $50 to his campaign. The appellant argued that no candidate holding office in a corporation and performing duties not in common to the general public could receive contributions from the corporation. The court, in holding that no violation of this statute had occurred, said and we quote:
". . . It is clear, we think, the reference to the performance of duties 'in his official capacity' pertains to the duties of the public office which he is seeking. . . ."
The above section of the statute was again before the court in the case of Riddle v. Eaton, 447 S.W.2d 47 (1969), involving a race for sheriff in Jefferson County. The appellant, Riddle, contended that Sires, a deputy sheriff serving under Sheriff Joe Eaton, Sr., was prohibited from contributing anything of value to Joe Eaton, Junior's campaign for the office held by his father. In holding that there was no violation of the statute on behalf of candidate Joe Eaton, Jr., nor any evidence of coercion, the court declared and we quote:
"[3] Siers was a deputy sheriff hired by and under the supervision of county sheriff Joe Eaton, Sr., who is the father of the appellee, Joe Eaton, Jr. Riddle urges that because Siers is a deputy sheriff, Siers is prohibited from contributing anything of value to Joe Eaton, Junior's campaign for sheriff. One of the purposes of KRS 123.030 is to prevent coerced contributions from a person who may be under the dominion or control of a candidate for office. It is primarily for the protection of the employee. The trial court apparently did not believe that Siers was coerced to support Joe Eaton, Jr., for sheriff or that deputy Siers was 'required by law to perform any duties peculiar to Joe Eaton, Jr., not common to the general public, or to supervise, regulate or control in any manner the affairs of such person.'"
In reading the above excerpt of the statute as interpreted by the Hatcher and Riddle cases, it seems that it was designed to prohibit an employee fron contributing or being coerced into contributing to the candidacy of his employer. At the same time it would also appear designed to prevent an employee from contributing or being coerced into contributing to a candidate seeking the office in which he is employed and where he thus may be under the control of such candidate.
In applying the above interpretation of the statute to your questions involving a candidate for the office of county commissioner, our response to each question would be in the negative since county officers and employees would not be under the candidate's personal or individual direction or control if presently holding the office of commissioner, or if he assumes said office, as he is but one of four voting members of the fiscal court which of course includes the county judge. On the other hand, if he is presently a commissioner, it would appear that the restriction would apply to those employees on his staff over which he would have control of their hiring and firing.
You pose a further question which is as follows:
"A further question, presented orally, concerned a home-owner contributing money to a candidate for the office of Property Evaluation Administrator."
You will note that the quoted excerpt of KRS 121.045 contains the language that no person shall contribute money or services towards the nomination or election of any officer who, in his official capacity, is required by law "to perform any duty in assessing the property of such person for taxation. "
Since the Property Evaluation Administrator has the duty to assess most, if not all, property in the county pursuant to KRS 132.420, a homeowner subject to such assessment would, in light of the foregoing interpretation of the referred to statute, be prohibited from contributing to a candidate for said office.