Request By:
Mr. Larry A. Walker
The News-Enterprise
P.O. Box 430
408 West Dixie Avenue
Elizabethtown, Kentucky 42701
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Thomas R. Emerson, Assistant Attorney General
This is in reply to your letter stating that on June 13, 1977, the Hardin Fiscal Court voted to raise the monthly salaries of the magistrates from $260 to $322 effective July 1.
You refer to a 1975 opinion of this office (OAG 75-317) stating that salaries of county officials must be set not later than the first Monday in May of the year of the election of the officials. You ask whether a law has been violated, what the law states concerning pay raises for county officials, when a motion for salary increases for county officials should be introduced, whether the fiscal court's action must be rescinded and what is the "spirit" of the law.
Since the above mentioned opinion was rendered in 1975 the Kentucky General Assembly has enacted several amendments applicable to that section of the law dealing with the salaries of magistrates. The present status of the law concerning magistrates' salaries is somewhat confused but, perhaps, this letter and the enclosed opinions will shed some light on the matter and answer most of your questions.
KRS 64.530 provides in part that the fiscal court is required to set salaries not later than the first Monday in May of the year of the election. Furthermore, the old monthly salary limit of $260 for magistrates on the fiscal court has been retained in KRS 64.530 as has the provision that salaries shall not be increased during the terms of the magistrates.
However, the 1976 Regular Session of the Kentucky General Assembly amended KRS 64.527 by placing justices of the peace (magistrates) under the annual "rubber dollar" principle. Under this principle salaries may be "adjusted" to keep pace with the purchasing power of the dollar and such "adjustments" are not considered to be salary increases. See
Commonwealth v. Hesch, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 362 (1965). At this point we would also direct your attention to OAG's 76-741, 76-548 and 76-220, copies enclosed, particularly the latter at page two where we said:
"The 'rubber dollar' principle of equating current salaries with the purchasing power of the 1949 dollar [when § 246, Constitution, was amended] is applied where the legislature has enacted specific legislation 'adjusting' the dollar. The monetary level of $7200 appearing in § 246, Constitution, applies to county officers, for purposes of considering adjusting legislation. KRS 64.527 is this adjusting legislation applying to all officers named therein, and now including justices of the peace, county commissioners and coroners.
Commonwealth v. Hesch, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 362 (1965).
The obvious intent of the statute was to arrive at a current and annual compensation level computed by applying the change in the consumer price index to the 1949 base of $7,200. For example, the maximum compensation for such county officials under KRS 64.527 for the calendar year of 1976 is $16,768.80."
Note also our comments to the effect that there may be legal difficulty in applying the maximum salary to justices of the peace in all counties and that the particular justices' work schedule should be considered in determining salaries. In addition, see OAG 77-382, copy enclosed, dealing with magistrates' salaries.
Complicating the matter further was the fact that during the 1976 Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly two different bills purported to amend KRS 64.527, effective in January of 1978. One bill placed the justice of the peace in the annual "rubber dollar" adjustment statute and the other left him out. See OAG 77-323, copy enclosed, where we said when the two bills are read together the justice of the peace would probably be held to be retained in KRS 64.527. Again, while the "rubber dollar" principle authorizes an "adjustment" of the magistrates' salaries anytime (even during the term) where the maximum compensation has not been attained, the courts might upset a salary schedule deemed to be unreasonable under the total circumstances.
In conclusion, magistrates at the present time are included in the annual "rubber dollar" adjustment of compensation as set forth in KRS 64.527. The fiscal court, where the maximum statutory salary is not attained, can always "adjust" the magistrates' salaries, within the statutory maximum, even during their terms of office. Such "adjustments" are not considered salary increases in violation of the statute prohibiting salary increases during the term of office. The fiscal court should, however, evaluate the magistrates' work schedule in considering any "adjustments" as the maximum salary may not be justified in all instances.