Request By:
Honorable Buddy R. Salyer
Attorney at Law
129 East Main Street
Morehead, Kentucky 40351
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of August 17 in which you question the soundness of OAG 70-287 with respect to its conclusion that police officers of a city of the fourth class have countywide jurisdiction to arrest for offenses against the state.
We have reviewed the conclusion reached in the referred to opinion and believe that it is correct. As a matter of fact, the case of
Earle v. Latonia Agricultural Ass'n., 127 Ky. 578, 106 S.W. 312 (1907), cited in OAG 70-287 clearly substantiates this conclusion. In addition, we call your attention to the case of
Partin and Allen v. Commonwealth, 197 Ky. 840, 248 S.W. 489 (1923), construing KS 3687 [now KRS 95.800] pertaining to the jurisdiction of the city marshal in sixth class cities. This statute is identical to the language expressed in KS 3495 [now KRS 95.740] relating to cities of the fourth class. The Court in the Partin and Allen case declared the following:
"(2). The appellant, Partin, was a peace officer, and under section 3687 of the Kentucky Statutes, which is a part of charters of cities of the sixth class, he is given the same right to make arrests anywhere in his county as is possessed by the sheriff, and this court held in the case of
Helm v. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L.R. 165, and others referred to therein, that a marshal of a sixth class city had the right to make arrests outside of the corporate limits of his town and within his county, . . ."
See also the case of Heather v. Thompson, 25 KLR 1574, 78 S.W. 194 (1904). In the case of Helm v. Commonwealth cited in the above quote, the court made the following explanatory statement concerning the language giving the town marshal the same jurisdiction as sheriffs by stating:
". . . Before the adoption of the present statutes, when the towns of the state were governed by special charters, it was common to insert in them provisions giving the marshal the same authority as the sheriff within the county in which the town was situated. . . ."
It is true that the jursidiction of the county sheriff is not clearly stated either in the Constitution or statutes; however, the sheriff is a peace officer pursuant to KRS 446.010 with the power of arrest pursuant to KRS 431.005. He is a countywide officer as declared in § 99 of the Constitution and, as a consequence, has countywide jurisdiction which obviously includes the power of arrest.
Since you also mentioned the jurisdiction of constables, we call your attention to the fact that constables have countywide jurisdiction pursuant to § 101 of the Constitution and KRS 70.350(2), which includes of course countywide arrest powers under the previously cited sections of the statutes defining peace officers and their power of arrest.
Under the circumstances, OAG 70-287 continues to express the opinion of this office and is therefore affirmed.