Request By:
Mr. John P. Blevins
Metcalfe County Attorney
Courthouse
Box 187
Edmonton, Kentucky 42129
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
The Metcalfe Fiscal Court would like an opinion on the following question:
"Who has the authority to decide the use of the Metcalfe County Courtroom, the Metcalfe Fiscal Court, the Metcalfe District Judge, the Metcalfe Circuit Judge, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky?"
The pertinent facts are as follows:
"On January 10, 1978 the Metcalfe County Fiscal Court passed a resolution stating that the Court had no space available for the District Court as a courtroom. This courtroom is used for Fiscal Court, driver's licensing, social security interviews, veterans affairs interviews, and a place of public assembly for county organizations. On January 24, 1978 an Order was issued by the District Court which is self-explanatory.
"The court relies on KRS 26A.100 in that court shall be held in the county court-house unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court. The Fiscal Court relies on the same statute in that providing such space would interrupt county government. "
KRS 26A.100(1) provides that the circuit and district court shall be held in the county courthouse of each county unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court, in which case it may be held at any other location made available by the county and owned, leased, or controlled by the county. Circuit or district court may also be held in such other locations in the county as may be convenient and approved by the Supreme Court.
In KRS 26A.100(2), it is provided that every county or urban county government shall provide such reasonably available space which would not disrupt the operation of county government as necessary in the county courthouse, or in other county facilities as permitted in subsection (1), for courtrooms for circuit and district court, chambers for district and circuit judges, office space for circuit and district court staffs, facilities for circuit clerk, jury facilities for circuit and district court, and such other facilities necessary for operation of district and circuit courts as may be agreed upon by the county or urban county government and the administrative office of the courts.
Subsection (5) of KRS 26A.100 provides that where suitable court and clerk facilities are not available in public facilities, private facilities may be rented, leased, purchased, or otherwise acquired, by the Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to permission granted by the Chief Justice for such acquisition and in compliance with KRS Chapters 45 and 56.
On January 24, 1978, the Metcalfe District Court issued an order declaring that the court shall meet in the Metcalfe County courtroom in the courthouse every Wednesday at 9:00 a.m. and will continue in session until its business is concluded or until otherwise ordered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Kentucky. It recites that the resolution of the Metcalfe Fiscal Court entered January 10, 1978, denying the Metcalfe District Court any space in the Courthouse due to unavailability is unlawful and of no binding effect. It states that interference with the Metcalfe District Court either directly or indirectly in carrying out its duties will be dealt with as contempt.
Of course, KRS 26A.100 must be read as a whole for it to make sense and to arrive at its purpose, for the statute is somewhat ambiguous. Henry v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 491, 228 S.W.2d 32 (1950) 33.
Undoubtedly the legislature intended to weigh the sheer urgency of housing the new court system against the housing of necessary and vital county governmental operations in county courthouses and other county buildings. The housing of the new court system was to be given a high priority, subject, however, to the principle that necessary county governmental operations would not be disrupted. The provision that the county shall provide such "reasonably available space" to the court system indicates, we think, that the initial determination of whether reasonably available space exists in a particular county is addressed, not to the judicial courts, but to the fiscal courts. Further, we are of the opinion that the fiscal court's decision in this matter is final, except where the courts determine in an appropriate suit that the fiscal court acted arbitrarily in determining that the space was not reasonably available for the courts.
Under KRS 26A.100 and KRS 67.080(6) [fiscal court controls the fiscal affairs and property of the county] the fiscal court has authority to allocate space in the county courthouse or other county buildings. This authority can only be reversed by the courts, in a proper law suit, where they deem that the fiscal court has acted arbitrarily in its allocation decisions. See § 2, Kentucky Constitution, and Pulaski Fiscal Court v. Floyd, Ky., 374 S.W.2d 863 (1964) 864. There Judge Palmore, for the court, recognized the superior power of the fiscal court to regulate and control the county's buildings.
Based on the foregoing authorities and analysis, it is further our opinion that the district court's order of January 24, 1978, in so far as it purports to declare that the district court will take over the courthouse courtroom under the scheduling specified therein, is invalid for lack of jurisdiction. Cf. KRS 24A.010, relating to a district court's jurisdiction. "It is the general rule that where the conditions for the exercise of the power of a court are wanting the judicial power is not, in fact, lawfully invoked." Roberts v. Watts, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 513 (1953). We can find no case decision or statute which would vest the district court with jurisdiction to issue an order of the kind that was issued here. Here the conditions for the proper exercise of the court's jurisdiction are wanting. Further, we understand that the district court order was not issued in the context of actual litigation pending in that court. In fact, if the district court does not like the fiscal court order, he would have to file an appropriate suit in circuit court and ask for revocation of the fiscal court order on the ground of its being arbitrary, if that were the case.