Request By:
Honorable Jacob P. Cline III
Attorney at Law
Box 326 Courthouse Square
Pineville, Kentucky 40977
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; C. David Clauss, Assistant Attorney General
The question which you present is to what court should a land owner address his application for removal and relocation of an abandoned grave or cemetery, as indicated by KRS 381.755.
A reading of KRS 381.755(1) reveals that the sentence there written has two clauses which set forth, respectively, the two methods by which "the court" may order or resolve that the grave or cemetery be removed or relocated. Omitting the first modifying clause, the sentence, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
"[W]henever the fiscal court of any county deems it to be in the best interest of the county to remove and relocate any such [abandoned] grave or cemetery the court may issue an order or resolution. . . ."
As read, minus the first modifying clause, the wording is more easily analyzed. The sentence now provides that when a fiscal court believes the county's best interests will be served, the court may issue the appropriate order or resolution. The sentence refers to only one court with specificity; and that one court is "fiscal court." The sentence does not require that fiscal court make any application to any other court or otherwise in order to authorize the removal or relocation. Rather, the only requirement of the sentence, as written without the first modifying clause, is that "fiscal court . . . [deem] it to be in the best interest of the county. . . ."
The clear implication is that fiscal court itself has the authority to order the removal or relocation of abandoned graves and cemeteries. Logic would require an interpretation that the legislature intended that any land owner desirous of removing or relocating an abandoned grave or cemetery located on his property should make his application to the person or persons possessing the authority to act upon the application. Under KRS 381.755, fiscal court has the authority to order removal and relocation of abandoned graves and cemeteries.
When construing the terms of statutes, one must adopt a sense which best harmonizes with the context. General words are restricted to a sense analogous to less general words.
However, the principle of attributing analogous meaning to statutory provisions collocated with one another must, in this instance, be disregarded. KRS §§ 381.720, 381.730, 381.740, 381.750, 381.760, were all a part of a single legislative enactment of 1964. The referenced enactment deals with the procedure to be followed in declaring a cemetery to be abandoned and in filing an action in circuit court to declare the said cemetery to be abandoned and to vest title thereto in a city or governmental agency. The 1964 enactment, of course, refers explicitly to the filing of an action in circuit court.
Because the 1964 enactment refers to the acquiring of title of certain land (abandoned cemeteries) by governmental agencies, whereas KRS 381.755 refers to no change of title to any such abandoned cemetery, the word "court" appearing in KRS 381.755(1), cannot be deemed to refer to "circuit court" as per KRS 381.720(1), et seq.
Finally, KRS 371.755 indicates that the court which possesses the authority to order the removal or relocation of abandoned graves and cemeteries may authorize such removal or relocation by issuing "an order or resolution." Judicial courts do not have authority to issue resolutions.
For the foregoing reasons, and because in KRS 381.755(1) the general "court" follows the less general "fiscal court", the Attorney General of Kentucky is of the opinion that the word "court", as it appears in KRS 381.755(1), was intended by the legislature to mean "fiscal court."