Request By:
Hon. Clayton Kidwell
Mayor
City of Stamping Ground
Stamping Ground, Kentucky 40379
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Robert W. Hensley, Assistant Attorney General
First off, we apologize for this inordinate delay in answering your letter. It came in at the time we were preparing some legislation for the 1978 Legislature and with our on-going litigation we were unable to answer your letters as quickly as we wanted.
Also Mayor, we must emphasize that what you are about to read is our opinion based upon the judicial system in Kentucky as it existed prior to January 2, 1978 since as of that date police courts in Kentucky were abolished and the county judge no longer exercised any judicial function. However, even though January 2, 1978 is behind us, we wanted to answer your letter in order to clear up any possible uncertainties or disagreements in this area of the law. Also, Mayor, if after you read the following, and if, in view of the new court system as of January 2, 1978, you have any additional questions, please let us know.
In your letter you ask about the law (and again we emphasize that our answer will be discussing the law extant prior to January 2, 1978) applicable to a county judge trying citations issued by the city police of a city located within the county. In your letter you state that the county judge was refusing to accept any citations from the city police (of Stamping Ground, Kentucky) even though the city police were only citing violators for violations of Kentucky speed laws. We understand from your letter that you are asking about the propriety of this action by the county judge.
KRS 26.010 states as follows: "Except as provided in KRS 167.990, 208.020, subsection (4) of 208.990 and 242.990, police courts in cities of every class have jurisdiction exclusive of circuit courts in all penal and misdemeanor cases where the punishment is limited to a fine of not more than twenty dollars, jurisdiction concurrent with circuit courts of all penal and misdemeanor cases where the punishment is limited to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding twelve months, or both, and exclusive jurisdiction of all violations of city ordinances occuring within the city limits." *
KRS 25.010 provided: "Except as provided in KRS 167.990, 208.020 subsection (4) of 208.990 and 242.990, county, quarterly and justices' courts have jurisdiction exclusive of circuit courts in all penal and misdemeanor cases where the punishment is limited to a fine of not more than twenty dollars, and jurisdiction concurrent with circuit courts of all penal and misdemeanor cases where the punishment is limited to a fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than twelve months, or both." **
Thus, under these two KRS sections, police courts and county courts had concurrent jursdiction over violation of the Commonwealth's speed laws.
KRS 431.015 reads:
(1) A peace officer may issue a citation instead of making an arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person being cited will appear to answer the charge. The citation shall provide that the defendant shall appear within a designated time.
In our previous opinion, OAG 72-847 (copy included for your convenience) we opined: "Therefore, when a peace officer gives a citation, it is his prerogative to cite the violator to such court as he cares to." Also in our previous opinion, OAG 76-632 (copy included for your convenience) we stated: "In regard to violations which occur within the city limits which do not involve violations of city ordinances, the county court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the city police court under KRS 25.010 and 26.010 and the peace officer may cite the violator to either court."
Thus since our office has previously expressed its opinion that it is the officer's prerogative to determine into which court to cite the violator (presuming that the offense was one where either the city police court or the county court would have had jursidiction, which would have been the situation if the violation was for the Commonwealth's speed laws) we are of the opinion that the county judge was without authority to deny jurisdiction. See also OAG 70-56, copy included for your convenience.
Footnotes
Footnotes
* Repealed. 1976 ex s, S 15, § 491, eff. 1-2-78.
** Repealed. 1976 ex s, S 15, § 491, eff. 1-2-78.