Request By:
Mr. Noel Thomas
WVLK News
Phoenix Hotel
Lexington, Kentucky 40592
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
WVLK Radio, whom you represent, requests the opinion of this office concerning a provision in KRS 189.990(1), applying to first and second class Kentucky cities. One of the provisions of that subsection reads: "Neither court costs nor fees shall be taxed against any person convicted of violating paragraph (c) of subsection (4) of KRS 189.390. KRS 189.390(4)(c) provides that whenever the county court of any county containing a city of the first class or second class determines upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation and study that it is unsafe to park motor vehicles on or along any highway, other than a state highway, within the unincorporated areas of the county, or that in any business district the congestion of traffic justifies a reasonable limitation on the length of time any one (1) motor vehicle is permitted to park in such district so as to reduce such congestion, then the county court may by order establish "no parking" areas or limit the length of time any motor vehicle may be parked in any business district. " So it can be seen that under the express provisions of KRS 189.990(1) the taxing of fees and cost against any person convicted under the subject parking ordinance is prohibited.
You say that recently the Fayette County District Courts began a crackdown on parking ticket scofflaws, who failed to pay their fines by certain due dates. You also state there is a Fayette County ordinance apparently in conflict with this state law, since the ordinance authorizes the collection of court cost and late fees in overtime parking cases.
Your question is whether or not this prohibition against the imposing of various costs and fees in overtime parking cases is applicable to the Fayette County ordinance and similar ordinances in counties containing a city of the first or second class.
It is obvious that the provisions of KRS 189.390(4)(c) were designed to enable political subdivisions in the urban areas of Kentucky to deal effectively with the increasing problems involving traffic control and the related problem of parking in business districts and parking along those highways and streets entangled in the congestion of traffic. This problem, of course, continues to be one of the great problems facing the local governments in the urban areas of Kentucky.
There was enacted during the Extraordinary Session of 1976 what is now KRS 24A.175, relating to court costs in criminal cases in the district court. That statute reads:
"(1) Court costs for a criminal case in the district court shall be twenty dollars ($20).
"(2) Additional costs shall be assessed in district court criminal matters as follows: (a) Preparing an attestation$ .50(b) Preparing a certification1.00(c) Preparing a copy of a document (per page).25
"(3) Taxation of costs against a defendant, upon conviction, shall be mandatory and shall not be prorated or suspended. "
It must be noted that subsection (3) of the latter statute provides that the taxation of costs against the defendant, upon conviction, "shall be mandatory and shall not be prorated or suspended. " (Emphasis added). Repeal by implication is not favored by the courts, although they are inclined to uphold such repeal where there is no other reasonable construction. City of Eddyville v. City of Kuttawa, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 404 (1961) 406. Here the intention to repeal the prohibition of KRS 189.990 is not clearly expressed through the language of KRS 24A.175.
KRS 67A.070 provides that urban county government ordinances shall be deemed to conflict with general statutes of this state only when the ordinance authorizes that which is expressly prohibited by a general statute.
We assume that the present urban county government ordinance is merely the continuation of the same principle expressed in an earlier Fayette County ordinance relating to parking violations and overtime parking cases. See KRS 67A.060 and 67A.070.
It may be noted that KRS 24A.175 (Ex. Sess.) 1976, Ch. 22, § 60, was approved on December 22, 1976, by the Governor. The amendment of KRS 189.990(1) (Ex. Sess.) 1976, Ch. 36, § 2, became law without signature on December 31, 1976. However, the basic (1956) prohibition of KRS 189.990(1) as to KRS 189.390(4)(c) was not changed.
In Campbell County Election Commission v. Weber, 240 Ky. 373, 42 S.W.2d 511 (1931), the court invoked the settled rule that where two statutes enacted at the same session are destructively repugnant, the law last enacted must be regarded as the final expression of the legislative will and permitted to prevail. Here the amended KRS 189.990(1) and KRS 24A.175 are destructively repugnant. Thus a reasonable construction is that the legislature, in republishing KRS 189.990(1) as to the prohibition against imposing costs in parking meter cases, clearly knew what it was doing and deliberately carried the exception to the general law forward. In addition, as between legislation of broad and general nature on one hand and legislation dealing minutely with specific matter on the other hand, the specific will prevail over the general. City of Bowling Green v. Board of Education, Ky., 443 S.W.2d 243 (1969) 247. Here the prohibition against imposing of costs in parking violations is specific, as contrasted with the generality of KRS 24A.175.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that the prohibition against imposing costs in parking cases is still the law in the Fayette County situation and in counties containing a city of the first or second class.