Request By:
Honorable David J. Holzderber
Attorney at Law
31 East Tenth Street
Newport, Kentucky 41071
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of May 23 in which you, as City Attorney for the city of Crestview [a city of the sixth class], request an opinion concerning the following:
"In February, 1978, the chairman called a special meeting of the Board of Trustees. Proper written notice of said meeting was given pursuant to the dictates of KRS 88.040 (1). A complaint filed against the city (which had to be answered prior to next regularly scheduled meeting) was discussed. Vote was taken whereby it was decided that the city should answer and defend this suit against the city.
"Was this meeting legally convened and did the Board have the power to make a decision at said meeting?"
Based on the facts presented, our response to your question would be in the affirmative. KRS 88.040(1) provides the following pertaining to special meetings:
". . . Special meetings may be called at any time by the chairman or by three (3) members, by written notice delivered at least three (3) hours prior to the time specified for the proposed meeting. . . ."
Since you indicate that proper notice was given of the special meeting, presumably pursuant to the above requirements of the statute, we assume that your real question is whether or not the notice was required to contain the agenda for the discussion and action at the special meeting. In this respect, since the statute does not require the purpose of the special meeting to be designated in the notice, none is required and the council is authorized to act on any matter that it chooses at the special meeting. Referring to McQuillin, Vol. 4., § 13.08(c), we quote the following:
". . . At any meeting of which due notice has been given, the governing body may, in the usual course, act on any matter."
Next referring to the case of City of Mt. Sterling v. King, 126 Ky. 526, 104 S.W. 322 (1907), pertaining to cities of the fourth class, which would be equally applicable to sixth class cities since neither charters require the purpose of special meetings to be designated, the Court in this case said and we quote:
"Section 3502, Ky. St. 1903, authorizes the mayor to call special sessions of the board of council whenever in his judgment it may be necessary, and at special sessions the council has the right to enact any ordinance within the powers of the council. There is no provision in the act for the government of cities of the fourth class prescribing the character of ordinances that may be enacted at special meetings of the council; and hence whatever the council may do at a regular session it may do at a special one. . . ."
Under the circumstances, we find no legal objection to the city council reaching a decision at the special meeting as to whether it will answer and defend a suit filed against it, where proper notice was given to all members as required by KRS 88.040(1).