Request By:
The Honorable Michael R. Moloney
State Senator, 13th District
605 Bank of Commerce Building
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in answer to your letter of January 10 in which you raise the question as to whether or not Rule 47, proposed for adoption by the Senate in accordance with its rule making authority under § 39 of the Constitution, is in violation of § 46 of the Constitution.
Section 46 reads in part as follows:
". . . But whenever a committee refuses or fails to report a bill submitted to it in a reasonable time, the same may be called up by any member, and be considered in the same manner it would have been considered if it had been reported. . . ."
Section 39 reads in part as follows:
". . . Each House of the General Assembly may determine the rules of its proceedings, . . ."
The proposed Rule 47 reads as follows:
"Whenever a committee fails or refuses to report within a reasonable time a bill submitted to it, any member may, by filing with the clerk a written request signed by five or more members, call the same up for consideration on the next succeeding legislative day after the filing of said request. If a majority of the members elected to the Senate concur therein, the bill shall be considered as though it had been regularly reported."
Our response to your question would be in the affirmative. To begin with, we find nothing in the Constitutional Debates of 1890 on the subject, however, it is the general rule that words used in the Constitution must be given their plain and ordinary meaning.
City of Louisville Municipal Housing Commission v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W. 286 (1953). From the case of
Pinkston v. Watkins, 186 Ky. 365, 216 S.W. 852 (1919), we quote the following:
". . . Where the instrument, be it a constitution or a statute or private writing, is so plainly expressed that all difficulty or ambiguity as to its meaning is removed, there is no occasion for the requisition of assisting rules of construction or interpretation."
Also, of particular interest is certain language found in the case of
Varney v. Justice, 86 Ky. 596, 6 S.W. 457 (1888):
". . . The Constitution of the State was adopted by the people of the State as the fundamental law of the State, This fundamental law was designed by the people adopting it to be restrictive upon the powers of the several departments of government created by it. It was intended by the people that all departments of the State government should shape their conduct by this fundamental law. Its every section was, doubtless, regarded by the people adopting it as of vital importance, and worthy to become a part and parcel of the constitutional form of government, by which the governors as well as the governed were to be governed. Its every mandate was intended to be paramount authority to all persons holding official trusts, in whatever department of goverment, and to the sovereign people themselves. No mere unessential matters were intended to be ingrated in it; but each section and each article was solemnly weighed and considered, and found to be essential to the form of constitutional government adopted. . . . Whenever the language contains a grant of power, it was intended as a mandate. Whenever the language gives a direction as to the manner of exercising a power, it was intended that the power should be exercised in the manner directed, and in no other manner. It is an instrument of words, granting powers, restraining powers and reserving rights. These words are fundamental words, meaning the thing itself; they breathe no spirit except the spirit to be found in them. . . ." (Emphasis added).
Section 39 does give each house the power to enact rules of procedure, however, when a rule such as 47 places conditions, limitations or restrictions that materially affect the manner in which a member can exercise his right to call out a bill in face of the plain language of § 46 that contains no conditions, restrictions or limitations whatsoever, such a rule would appear to contravene the expressed directive and intent of § 46.
In other words, we do not believe § 39 gives the Senate the authority to adopt a rule of procedure that establishes any condition, restriction or limitation not contained in § 46 that materially affects the right of an individual member, on his own initiative, to call out a bill; and it is obvious that proposed Rule 47 does just that and must, as a consequence, be considered invalid.