Request By:
Mr. Vic Hellard, Jr.
Director
Legislative Research Commission
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Thomas C. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General
In your recent letter to the Attorney General, you raise the following question: "Is it reasonable for the personal service contract review committee to accept for filing from state agencies contracts which contain a cancellation clause of less than thirty days?"
You cite KRS 45.710, enacted during the 1978 Regular Session of the General Assembly, which provides as follows:
"Each service contract shall have a clause authorizing cancellation by the contracting agency on thirty (30) days' notice to the contractee. "
The language of KRS 446.080, which has been in existence since 1892 clearly states: "All statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature . . ."
"In the construction of a statute, the pole star by which the court must be guided is to ascertain and put into effect the legislative intention." See Ross v. Board of Education (1922), 196 Ky. 366, 244 S.W. 793.
There are numerous cases which reiterate the principle that "in construing a statute, the courts will consider the purpose which the statute is intended to accomplish, the reason and spirit of the statute, and the mischief intended to be remedied." See City of Louisville v. Helman, (1953) 253 S.W.2d 598. Also see Goodpaster v. Kenton & Campbell Benev. Burial Assn. (1939), 279 Ky. 92, 129 S.W.2d 1033; City of Covington v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 279 S.W.2d 746; Hamilton v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 262 S.W.2d 695; Board of Barbers and Beautician Examiners v. Mayo State Vocational School, 259 S.W.2d 452; Newbolt v. Board of Ed. of Berea Independent School Dist., 409 S.W.2d 513; City of Frankfort v. Triplett, 365 S.W.2d 328; and City of Owensboro v. Noffsinger, 280 S.W.2d 517.
It is the view of this office that the intent of the legislature will be fulfilled by allowing contracts with cancellation notices of shorter duration than the thirty days set forth in the statute. The obvious purpose of the statute was to allow the contractor to cancel a contract on thirty days' notice to the contractee rather than waiting until the entire contract period has expired. The obvious beneficiary would be the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It is impossible to accept the idea that a bill, which was passed for the purpose of improving state contracting procedures, could be so narrowly read that it would work to the detriment of its obvious intended beneficiary. If the contract provides for a period shorter than thirty days, there has been compliance with the intent of the statute.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of this office that the personal service contract review committee may accept for filing contracts which contain a cancellation clause of less than thirty days.