Request By:
Mr. James Monsour
Legislative Analyst
Legislative Research Commission
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: George Geoghegan III, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
In response to your letter of August 23, 1978, requesting an opinion as to the constitutionality of a proposed state-supported senior citizen discount program, please allow the following to serve as a reply. Specifically, you expressed the concern that such a program might unconstitutionally discriminate against other age groups not within the program.
The question presented in your letter deals with whether a state sponsored discount plan for senior citizens is discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Sections 1 and 59 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that, "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It has been well recognized that laws are usually to some extent inherently "unequal." Almost every statute involves some disparity of treatment, with few statutes affecting everyone in the country in the same manner. The rule is well settled that a state may classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislation and pass laws applicable only to persons or objects within a designated class. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 494, p. 859.
An essential requirement as to any classification, in order that it is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause, is that it must not be capricious or arbitrary, but must be reasonable and have a rational basis. In Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), the United States Supreme Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause requires ". . . that in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have 'some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.'" Where the statute in question does not affect a "fundamental right" or is not dealing with a "suspect classification, " the Supreme Court has indicated that if the classification made by the statute is rational and furthers a legitimate governmental purpose, and where all members of the class are treated equally, the statute will be upheld as constitutional. Under this approach, a statute will be found to be constitutional if any state of facts may reasonably be conceived in its justification.
If a classification in a statute meets the prerequisites that it be reasonable and not arbitrary, is based upon substantial distinctions with a proper relationship to the persons classified and the purposes sought to be achieved, and operates alike on all members of the designated class, it is not in violation of the federal guaranty of equal protection. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 502, p. 878. In Walters v. Binder, Ky., 435 S.W.2d 464 (1968), the Kentucky Court of Appeals equated Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution with the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. As such, it would seem that if the statute in question is not violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, it is not violative of Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that such statutory classifications, meeting the requirements set out above, will be held valid. In Rinaldi v. Yeager, Id., the Court stated, "The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same . . . . Hence, legislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends." In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) it was stated, ". . . mere classification . . . does not of itself deprive a group of equal protection. " And in Levy v. Louisiana, the Court stated, "Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the test, for the validity of a state's classification is whether the line drawn is a rational one."
Finally, the statute in question might be challenged on the ground that it is violative of Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution which provides: "In all other cases where a ground law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted." It is clear that the proposed statute in question does not run afoul of Section 59 as special legislation. "Local or special legislation . . . applies exclusively to special or particular places, or special and particular persons, and is distinguished from a statute intended to be general in its operation and relating to classes of persons or subjects." Stone v. Wilson, 43 S.W. 397; Safety B. & L. Assoc. v. Ecklar, 50 S.W.50; Walters v. Binder, 435 S.W.2d 464.
In conclusion, it is the opinion of this office that if the proposed statute in question meets the requirements set forth in the above-cited cases and materials, under the "rational basis" approach, it would not be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution nor Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution. In addition such a statute would not violate Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution.