Request By:
Mr. Tipton "Tip" Baker
Harlan County Judge/Executive
P.O. Box 944
Harlan, Kentucky 40831
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
You request an opinion on two points. You ask whether it is necessary for an airport board to be approved by the fiscal court or can the county judge make the appointments? We assume that this particular airport board has been created by Harlan County, through action of the fiscal court under KRS 183.132.
Under subsection (3)(b) of that statute, and where the airport board is established by a county, the statute provides that "such members shall be appointed by the county judge/executive."
KRS 67.710(8), enacted in 1976, is a general statute providing that, with the approval of the fiscal court, the county judge/executive makes appointments to various boards and commissions.
The above two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict. In this situation it is our opinion that the later statute should control. KRS 183.132 was last amended in 1964, and KRS 67.710(8) was passed during the extraordinary session of 1976. In the same bill containing the creation of KRS 67.710 [S.B. 18, Ch. 20, Ex. Sess., 1976], KRS 183.132(3)(b) was amended to merely change "county judge" to "county judge/executive."
"It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that whenever in the statutes on any particular subject there are apparent conflicts which cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls." Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205, 220 S.W.2d 398 (1949) 400. See also City of Eddyville v. City of Kuttawa, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 404 (1961) 406, citing the rule that "a general statute is not to be construed as repealing a previous particular act unless there is some express reference to the previous legislation on the subject or unless the two acts are necessarily inconsistent."
It is our opinion that any appointment to this airport board must be made by way of nomination made by the county judge/executive, subject to the approval or disapproval of the nomination by the members of the fiscal court acting as a body. See OAG 78-466, copy enclosed.
You ask the question as to the legal significance of your signing a check for material purchased by a magistrate.
A magistrate on the fiscal court has no authority on his own to make a purchase. The members of the fiscal court have no executive authority except where given such by statute. Of course, where the fiscal court approves of a purchase by its action as a body, then you and the county treasurer are required to co-sign the check of payment. n1 The county judge/executive has no authority to delegate any purchasing authority to a particular magistrate on the court.
As you suggest, it is up to the fiscal court as a body to take appropriate action in connection with approving and directing purchases for the county; and the administrative handling of the purchases to be made are from that point on the responsibility of the county judge/executive. However, where bidding is required, the sealed bids should be opened in a meeting of fiscal court; and the award should be made by the fiscal court acting as a body. See KRS 67.710. We believe that you are correct in the idea that when a magistrate leaves a meeting of the fiscal court, he has no interim duties of an administrative or executive nature, since the statutes are silent on that point.