Request By:
Mr. C. Timothy Cone
Commissioner of Law
Lexington Fayette Urban County Government
The Municipal Building
136 Walnut Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40507
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; By: Thomas C. Jacobs, Deputy Attorney General
This office is in receipt of your letter dated November 1, 1978 wherein you request an opinion regarding recent legislation concerning officers of urban-county governments. Your question may be stated as follows:
Did H.B. 68, relating to officers of urban-county governments, meet the requirements of § 51 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky wherein it is provided:
"No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title"?
H.B. 68 (1978 Acts, Chap. 166, p. 508), entitled "An Act relating to citation officers for urban-county governments", now codified as Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) 67A.075, 67A.076, and 67A.025, concerns the appointment, duties and compensation of safety officers and citation officers, and deals with the appointment, duties and compensation of the chief administrative officer of an urban-county government. The real question is whether § 3 of the Act concerns a subject other than that expressed in the title of H.B. 68 and is, therefore, invalid as improperly enacted. For the following reasons we feel that KRS 67A.025 is valid.
In order to fully understand the impact of § 51, one must consider the historical reason this section was inserted in our Constitution. In Conley v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 125, 32 S.W. 285, 286 (1895), the Court said with regard to whether the statute involved therein was unconstitutional under § 51:
"In considering the question, we must look to the purpose of the framers of our fundamental law in incorporating this provision into the Constitution, and to the spirit of this provision. Many years ago it was determined and judicially declared by this court that the purpose of this provision of the Constitution was to remedy the evils of a practice, which has become prevalent of uniting in the same legislative acts subjects which had no relation to each other, and of permitting amendments to a bill by which matters wholly distinct from it, and wholly unconnected with the subject of which it was treated, were introduced into it, and thereby an improper influence was brought to bear in its final passage . . ." (Emphasis added)
Section 51 has been considered many times by the courts of this state. Where the Act in question does not fall within those practices sought to be precluded by § 51, the section has been given a liberal construction. As was stated in South v. Fish, 181 Ky. 347, 205 S.W. 329 (1918):
"There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted. . . . It is well known that the principal object of § 51 of the Constitution is that neither the members of the legislature nor the public should be misled by the title."
Later in the same case, it was stated:
"It has been aptly said that the purpose of this constitutional provision concerning titles to legislative acts is, first, to prevent log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation, and which might, therefore, be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon." South, Supra, at 330. (Emphasis added)
The final element to be considered in judging an Act under § 51 is whether its title is general or restrictive. If the title is too restrictive, a provision contained in the body of the Act could be invalid if not specifically considered in the title. However, if the title can be said to be general, anything related to the subject contemplated by the title would be valid. This determination must be made with the purpose of § 51 in mind. As was stated in Miller v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 215, 187 S.W.2d 837, 838 (1945):
"In the light of the above [purpose of § 51], it is obvious that in order to constitute a plurality of subjects, the Act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects. If the subdivision or section is germane to the general subject, it should be held to be included in the general. It is not ordinarily objectionable in the general. It is not ordinarily objectionable that the title of the Act does not embrace or dispose of everything to which it relates, providing it is not entirely misleading and is fairly, reasonably and logically related to the scope and purpose of the Act. On the other hand, it is the general rule that a statute shall be interpreted so as to render it consistent with its general scope, and should not be construed in such a manner as to render it partly ineffective and inoperative."
In view of the above-cited principles, under which Acts are judged in relation to § 51, it is our opinion that KRS 67A.025 is a valid statutory provision. The title to H.B. 68 can be said to embrace the general subject of urban-county governments. All the provisions of this bill related directly to this general subject. Thus, the provision regarding chief administrative officers is not fatally "dissimilar" from the other provisions of the Act. Further, at the time this measure was being considered, public awareness was great due to the amount of publicity which surrounded its enactment. Finally, there is no indication whatever of any fraud or misunderstanding which resulted from the title of the Act.
Based on the above, it is our opinion that any apparent discrepancy between the title to H.B. 68 and § 3 of that Act is not the type contemplated by § 51. Therefore, in keeping with the liberal construction which has historically been given this section, it is our opinion that KRS 67A.025 was properly enacted and is a valid statutory provision.