Request By:
Hon. Constance E. Revlett
Attorney at Law
Sacramento, Kentucky 42372
Opinion
Opinion By: Robert F. Stephens, Attorney General; Joseph R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General
This is in response to your letter dated April 17, 1979, in which you request an opinion of this office regarding the applicability of KRS 304.39-085 to common carriers involved in interstate commerce. Specifically, you inquire whether the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission which require common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to carry liability insurance coverage and display a placard evidencing such coverage on the door of the truck preempts state legislation in this field. As you have pointed out, the amount of liability insurance coverage required by the Interstate Commerce Commission is far in excess of that required by Kentucky,
The rule in Kentucky is that the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution in no way relieves or obstructs the state in the exercise of its police powers.
Riis v. Commonwealth, Ky. 418 S.W.2d 396 (1967). It has been held that the United States Constitution does not prevent the states from regulating matters of local concern with respect to which Congress has not exercised its power even though the regulation has an effect on interstate commerce.
Epstein v. Lordi, 261 F.Supp. 921 (D.N.J. 1966). Where a state statute furthers a legitimate local interest and the effects on interstate commerce are by comparison slight, the statute will not be considered an interference with interstate commerce,
Upholstered Furniture Action Council v. California Bureau of Home Furnishings, 442 F.Supp. 565 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
In the case of
Huron Portland Cement Company v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 4 L. Ed. 2d 852, 80 S. Ct. 813 (1960) the Supreme Court stated as follows:
In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, it must be born in mind that the Constitution when conferring upon Congress the regulations of commerce . . . never intended to cut the states off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.
It has been held that the federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce and the state's police powers are coordinate powers which each must respect. See
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Martin, 24 F.Supp. 924; affirmed
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 60 S. Ct. 163, 308 U.S. 132, 84 L. Ed. 128. It has been held that the test of whether both federal and state legislation may operate so that the federal legislation has not preempted the state legislation is whether both can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field.
Bloom v. City of Worcester, Mass. 293 N.E.2d 268 (1973).
In the present case, we are faced with a federal law and a state law which have as their objective the curtailment of the same evil. The purpose of both laws is to assure that uninsured motor vehicles will not utilize the public roadways. The difference is that the federal government has adopted a more stringent standard regulating common carriers engaged in interstate commerce than has the Commonwealth of Kentucky in regulating all motor vehicles utilizing Kentucky's roadways in their liability insurance requirements. Therefore, in essence this does not involve a question of federal preemption at all for the reason that the federal and state efforts exist within a complementary governmental framework and where both have the same objectives. See
Marshall v. Consumers Powers Company, Mich. App. 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975). The state statutes and federal regulations do not conflict with one another but are complementary.
KRS 304.99-060(5) specifically provides that anyone who exhibits to the court proof of insurance coverage on the citation date must be acquitted. The sole purpose of KRS 304.39-085 is to promote the enforcement of Kentucky's mandatory insurance law which requires that the motor vehicle owner maintain security for minimum tort liability. Because this purpose has been adequately served by the Interstate Commerce Commission Regulation, the requirements of the state law have been satisfied.
However, our inquiry does not end here because there is an additional requirement contained in the Kentucky Statute not found in the Interstate Commerce Commission Regulations. KRS 304.39-080(5) requires that an owner of a motor vehicle registered in Kentucky or operated in Kentucky by him or with his permission must provide by a contract of insurance or by qualifying as a self-insurer security for the payment of basic reparation benefits. As long as the owner of the motor vehicle provides for the payment of basic reparation benefits or personal injury protection by a contract of insurance or by qualifying as a self-insurer, in addition to coverage for tort liability, the requirements of the state statute have been met.