Request By:
Mr. Wendell Reynolds
Route 2, Box 161
Jackson, Kentucky 41339
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Walter C. Herdman, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
This is in response to your letter of February 13, in which you raise the question as to whether or not you would be required to purchase a city sticker from the City of Jackson under the following related facts.
"I am employed by the Department of Education, Frankfort, Kentucky. I am assigned to the following Eastern Kentucky counties: Breathitt, Owsley, Perry, Letcher, Knott, Magoffin, Johnson, Floyd and Pike County - see attached map.
I am utilizing a state car which I check out each morning and return daily, except when I am out of the county on a project or meeting that requires more than one day. Then the car is returned to the Tenth District Highway Office, which is located off Ky. 15, Jackson, Ky. 41339.
The city's contention is because I am required to monitor the following schools, Jackson Independent School, Breathitt County High School, L.B.J. Elementary, and Sebastian Middle School, all in the city limits and thus requiring the city sticker.
The division of School Food Services, a division of the Kentucky Department of Education, which I am an employee, requires that all schools in a consultants assigned area shall be monitored at least every 36 calendar months. Please see attached computer print-out of the months each school listed above has been monitored. "
The fact that you are driving a car owned by the Commonwealth of Kentucky and are required to monitor the schools located in the City of Jackson would, in our opinion, exempt you from being required to obtain a city automobile license sticker from the City of Jackson. This question has more or less been decided by the old Court of Appeals in the case of Georgetown v. Morrison, Ky., 362 S.W.2d 289 (1962). In this case, the question was raised as to whether or not the sheriff was liable for a city automobile tax in connection with his privately owned car which was used exclusively in the performance of his official duties. The Court held that the question resolved into whether a city may require a tax on the use of a motor vehicle used exclusively in the service of the state on pain of the arrest of the officer driving it and thereby obstructing him in the performance of his duties. The Court pointed out further that the sheriff performed duties for the state for which he was paid and that it seemed to the court that the ordinance could not be made to apply to a motor vehicle used and operated exclusively in the service of the state. Your situation is similar except for the fact that the automobile is a state-owned vehicle, which would be additional evidence on its face that the city could not require a state-owned vehicle to be licensed that is presumed to be operated exclusively on state business.