Request By:
Mr. Fred Cowan
Commonwealth of Kentucky
State Representative
32nd Legislative District
Capitol Building
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
You have requested our opinion as to the constitutionality of H.B. 275 of the present session.
The bill provides new sections in KRS Chapters 67 and 186 for the enforcement of motor vehicle emissions inspection and maintenance programs in any county required, pursuant to the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. , to establish a motor vehicle emissions inspection and maintenance program. Section 7401 of that Act states the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of states and local governments. The Act states it is the intent of the federal legislators to provide the state and local governments with technical and financial assistance as relates to air pollution prevention and control. However, § 7501 stresses nonattainment areas, i.e., areas in which the air pollutant exceeds any national ambient air quality standard for such pollutant. Thus the emissions program could at least involve Jefferson and counties in Northern Kentucky.
We concluded in OAG 78-550, copy attached, that any affected fiscal court may establish by ordinance, pursuant to KRS 67.083(3)(h) and (t), a mandatory motor vehicle emissions inspection - maintenance program. This is vital in the local implementation of the federal statutes on clean air. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(8) et seq. In our statute, KRS 67.083(3)(h) and (t), the General Assembly is saying that a fiscal court can enact reasonable ordinances relating to the "air" in the related interest of enforcement of traffic regulations. We read together subsections (3), (c), (d), (h), and (t) of KRS 67.083, relating to the public health and safety and traffic regulation.
H.B. 275 provides in Section 1 (Ch. 67) that any county required to establish such a motor vehicle emissions program may require by the ordinance that no motor vehicle required to be registered in the county shall be issued a certificate of registration or a registration renewal receipt by the county clerk without proof that the motor vehicle is in compliance with the county ordinance emissions program.
It is our view that this requirement is a valid exercise by the state of its police power in regulating the use of its highways by motor vehicles. The provision as to proof of compliance with the emissions ordinance is reasonable, since it has a reasonable relation to the public health and safety of the public. See
Schoo v. Rose, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 940 (1954). This direct and reasonable relationship to the public health and safety overcomes any constitutional question of special legislation under § 59, Kentucky Constitution, or arbitrariness under § 2 (due process etc.), Kentucky Constitution. Cf. also
Department of Revenue v. Williams, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 875 (1961), wherein the court struck down a statute providing that a car could not be registered except where there was proof of payment of ad valorem taxes. The court said it was simply a revenue enactment, and not one involving the proper exercise of the state's police powers. It violated the spirit of §§ 29 and 59, Constitution, as was held in Schoo v. Rose, above.
Section 2 of H.B. 275 (Ch. 186) imposes the same type of restriction on motor vehicle registrations and requires, as a condition for registration, proof of the owner that he is in compliance with the county's emissions ordinance.
For reasons given above, we believe the bill is constitutional.
We see no problem with the fact that the establishing of the rule, that motor vehicle registrations cannot be effected until evidence of compliance with the emissions ordinance is furnished the county clerk, is merely optional with the affected fiscal court. The application of the law would be such that it would embrace all of the class to which it relates. Thus every motor vehicle operator in the particular county having an emissions ordinance would be under the same rule, where the county opts to establish the condition precedent relating to registrations. See