Request By:
Mrs. Pamela S. Johnson
Administrative Services Supervisor
Kentucky Retirement Systems
226 West Second Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; Linda Carnes Wimberly, Assistant Attorney General
This is in reply to your letter asking for an opinion from this office concerning the proper beneficiary of Robert Edward Goodman for the purpose of distributing monthly benefits under the County Employes Retirement System.
According to information supplied by you, Robert Edward Goodman named as principal beneficiary, Corine Goodman, his wife, and as contingent beneficiary, Bessie Johnson, his mother, on a membership information form filed with the Kentucky Retirement Systems on April 30, 1975. A State of Illinois Death Certificate indicates that Mr. Goodman died on November 14, 1981. The death certificate notes that Mr. Goodman was married and survived by Corine Lacey (maiden name). However, the Advice of Personnel Action form of the Kentucky Retirement Systems includes information that the decedent's marriage to Corine Goodman was annulled due to her never legally divorcing a previous spouse.
Kentucky Revised Statutes 61.510 to 61.705 governs the Kentucky Employes Retirement System. Specifically, KRS 61.542(1)(a) states:
Each member shall designate a principal beneficiary and may designate a contingent beneficiary. This designation shall remain in full force and effect until changed by the member except a final divorce decree terminates an ex-spouse' s status as beneficiary, unless the member redesignates the ex-spouse as beneficiary subsequent to the issuance of the divorce decree.
According to the information supplied by you in regard to Mr. Goodman, it appears that he has properly designated a principal and contingent beneficiary as allowed by the above-mentioned statute. There is no indication that he subsequently changed the beneficiaries. Therefore, according to KRS 61.542(1)(a), the designation should remain in full force and effect, except if there is a final divorce decree. The question that arises is whether an annulment should be treated the same as a final divorce decree, thereby terminating the ex-spouse' s status as beneficiary.
It is important to note that the previously cited statute refers specifically to the effect of a divorce decree on the designated beneficiaries. Statutory requirements must control in determining the eligibility of a beneficiary. The statute does not address the precise question presented by you. We must therefore determine whether an annulment should be treated the same as a divorce under the statute or whether it should have no effect on the named beneficiaries.
The state and federal courts have repeatedly stated that a statute must be construed, if possible, so as to give effect to the intent of
Congress or the Legislature. Stivers v. U.S., 440 F.2d 144 (C.A. 6th Cir.) (1971);
Wesley v. Board of Education of Nicholas County, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 28 (1966). But no intention may be read into a statute that is not justified by the language and the primary rule is to ascertain intention from the words employed in enacting the statute.
Gateway Const. Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1961);
Clark v. Clark, Ky. App., 601 S.W.2d 614 (1980). It is the opinion of this office that the language in KRS 61.542(1)(a) is unambiguous and that if the legislature had intended to include other exceptions in addition to the final divorce decree, they would have so stated. It is not the province of this office or the courts to include annulments of marriage as an exception to the statute where the Legislature has stated that only a final divorce decree will terminate an ex-spouse' s status as beneficiary.
In
Clark v. Clark, supra, the Court said that where no ambiguity exists a statute is to be interpreted according to the intent of the authors which intent is gleaned from what the authors actually said, not what they may have intended but did not say. There is no ambiguity where the statute specifically states that the exception applies to final divorce decrees. To include annulments within the exception would be to insert language that the legislators did not include.
It is the opinion of this office that where the employee, by statute, is permitted to designate a beneficiary to receive payment of benefits, and he did so, and did not change the designation, that designation shall remain in full force and effect, as the statute so states. Although the statute states that a final divorce decree terminates an ex-spouse' s status as beneficiary, it does not address the effect of an annulment, and an annulment should not be included in that exception. In this case, Robert Goodman specifically named Corine Goodman as principal beneficiary. He did not change that designation and there was not a final divorce decree. According to the statute, the designation shall remain in full force and effect. On this basis, Corine Goodman is entitled to payment of the benefits in question.