Request By:
Mr. David H. Bland
Kentucky Jailers Association
Route #2, McCowans Ferry Road
Versailles, Kentucky 40383
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
You mention that in OAG 82-314, in addressing the amendment to KRS 24A.175 by way of adding subsection (6) in 1982, we believed that subsection (5) and subsection (6) were not duplicative.
KRS 24A.175 relates to court costs for criminal cases in district court. Subsections (5) and (6) read:
(5) The circuit clerk shall, at the time fines and costs are paid over to the state, pay five dollars ($5.00) from each court cost collected pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the county treasurer for use by the fiscal court for the sole purpose of defraying the costs of operation of the county jail and shall include among his reports to the administrative office of the courts the amounts paid to the county.
(6) The circuit clerk shall, at the time fines and costs are paid over to the state, pay five dollars ($5.00) from each court cost collected pursuant to subsection (1) of this section to the state treasury for the benefit and use of the Kentucky local correctional facilities construction authority pursuant to KRS 441.625 to 441.695.
Thus subsection (5) provides that the circuit clerk, at the time fines and costs are paid over to the state, shall pay five dollars ($5.00) from each court cost collected under subsection (1) to the county treasurer for use by the fiscal court "for the sole purpose of defraying the costs of operation of the county jail . . ." (Emphasis added). In 1982 subsection (6) was added. It provides that the circuit clerk shall, at the time fines and costs are paid to the state, pay five dollars ($5.00) from each court cost collected pursuant to subection (1) "to the state treasury for the benefit and use of the Kentucky local correctional facilities construction authority pursuant to KRS 441.625 to 441.695." (Emphasis added).
The two subsections are identical except as to the recipient of the five dollars ($5.00) and its subsequent use. Thus we concluded in OAG 82-314 that subsections (5) and (6) of KRS 24A.175 are not in duplication of each other, but involve two separate and distinct purposes, i.e., construction costs, and general operational costs.
Your question:
"Is not a county required to set aside the full amount collected pursuant to KRS 24A.175(5) for operational costs and not reserve any of those funds for construction or renovation?"
The costs of operation of the county jail would include the compensation of the jailer, the compensation of his legally authorized deputies, and statutorily authorized official expenses necessary for the jail function, generally, exclusive of construction costs. Funk v. Milliken, Ky., 317 S.W.2d 499 (1958).
The mandate of KRS 24A.175(5) is such that the fiscal court is restricted to using that money only for county jail operational costs. None of those funds can be reserved for some other purpose, such as jail construction costs. Cf. KRS 68.110, prohibiting the diversion of tax revenues.
In OAG 80-448, we concluded that the money accruing to counties for jail operational costs could be expended for jail construction, under the broad implications of the term "operational costs." However, the General Assembly, by adding subsection (6) to KRS 24A.175 in 1982 to cover "jail construction costs," changed the situation. It is now clear that subsection (6) money is to be used only for jail construction, while the subsection (5) money is to be used by the fiscal court for jail operational costs that do not include construction costs. That reasoning is buttressed by the fact that the General Assembly did not intend for subsections (5) and (6) to be in duplication. Neither subsection refers to the other by way of inclusion or exclusion. However, when they are read in pari materia, the emerging intent is that operational costs may cover any jail expense except construction costs. In that manner, the two subsections are a part of a connected system. Dieruf v. Louisville & Jefferson County Board of Health, 304 Ky. 207, 200 S.W.2d 300 (1947).
Finally, the principle that the specific shall prevail over the general means in this situation that subsection (6) must be recognized as being exclusive of subsection (5), since it deals with the specific expense of construction costs. City of Bowling Green v. Board of Education, Ky., 443 S.W.2d 243 (1969). OAG 80-448 is modified accordingly.