Request By:
Mr. James W. Utter
Corporation Counsel
City of Paducah
P.O. Box 2267
Paducah, Kentucky 42001
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; Walter C. Herdman, Asst. Deputy Attorney General
This is in response to your letter of September 15 in which you raise a question concerning the annexation of unincorporated territory by the city of Paducah, and more particularly the annexation of the Paducah County Club under the following related facts and question:
"The Paducah Country Club is developing a new 18-hole golf course, approximately one and one-half miles from the present city limits of the city of Paducah. The Board of Directors of the Paducah Country Club has requested the city to annex the Country Club into the city of Paducah. In reviewing their request we find that the only way in which the proposed property to be annexed can be connected to the present city limits would be for the city to annex approximately one and one-half miles of highway (US 62, a state maintained highway) from the city limits to a connecting point on the property owned by the Country Club.
In reviewing the Kentucky statutes, KRS 81A.410, it states that the city may annex any area which'. . . is adjacent or continuous to the city's boundaries.'
A question has arisen as to whether or not the above described annexation would be in compliance with KRS 81A.410."
Unless certain circumstances discussed below are present, our response to your question would be in the negative, as it relates to what is known as "corridor" annexation or an attempt to annex the Country Club by reaching it through the annexation of a public highway. As pointed out in the case of Riding v. City of Owensboro, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 510 (1964), which also involved the annexation of a public highway in order to get to the desired property, the court declared that the proposed annexation was a mere subterfuge and illegal though it did not rule out corridor annexation altogether. The court declared and we quote the following:
"We come now to the question of whether territory may properly be considered to be contiguous if its contiguity exists only through a corridor or finger. We think the answer should be that the proper contiguity should not be found to exist in such situations unless the corridor or finger itself has a municipal value, i.e., unless it alone serves some municipal purpose. Otherwise, the use of the corridor or finger must be considered a mere subterfuge.
We do not undertake to say that the annexation of a radial highway, alone, never could serve a legitimate municipal purpose, but in the instant case it is obvious that the annexation of the two highways was for the sole purpose of providing contiguity for the three annexed tracts. No reason or purpose is shown for the annexation of the highways as such. Under these circumstances it is our opinion that the annexation of the highways was a mere subterfuge, and therefore they cannot supply the necessary contiguity for the three tracts to which they lead.
A number of courts have held that corridor annexation is not proper. See Clark v. Holt, 218 Ark. 504, 237 S.W.2d 483; State ex rel. Danielson v. Village of Mound, 234 Danielson v. Village of Mound, 234 Minn. 531, 48 N.W.2d 855; Potvin v. Village of Chubbuck, 76 Idaho 453, 284 P.2d 414; People ex rel. Village of Worth v. Ihde, 23 Ill.2d 63, 177 N.E.2d 313; City of Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 P. 425, 27 L.R.A. 751; Wild v. People ex rel. Stephens, 227 Ill. 556, 81 N.E. 707."
We also refer you to McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Vol. 2, Section 7.20 and the cases cited under subnote 38.
Therefore, unless the annexation of a portion of U.S. 62, standing alone, has a municipal value, we must conclude that the unincorporated territory comprising the Country Club cannot be legally annexed by merely utilizing a portion of U.S. 62 as a corridor to reach the club property.