Request By:
Mr. Michael R. Greene
Attorney at Law
Suite 450 Hart Block Building
730 W. Main Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
You, as legal counsel for the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, request an opinion of this office on a question relating to the sheriff's deputies' travel allowance.
You letter reads in part:
The 1982 General Assembly passed legislation allowing the Sheriffs to pay to their deputies a travel allowance up to the sum of $300.00 per month. The question has arisen in my conversations with Mr. Jim O'Daniels, Comptroller of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, as to whether a deputy who actually incurs expenditures in excess of $300.00 per month would be entitled to actual reimbursement or would be limited to the sum of $300.00. This situation would most frequently arise when a deputy has to travel out of county in order to perform official business on behalf of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office.
KRS 64.345 was amended in the 1982 session (Ch. 111, § 1). KRS 64.345(2) reads:
In counties containing a city of the first class and in counties having an urban-county form of government, the amount, if any, allowed for the necessary office expenses of each officer shall be fixed by an order entered upon the order book of the circuit court, and signed by the chief judge thereof. In counties containing a city of the first class, each sheriff's deputy who uses his own automobile in the performance of official duties shall be authorized an allotment for expenses incurred, up to a maximum of three hundred dollars ($300) per month, to be paid out of the fees and commissions of the sheriff's office. In all other counties with a population of 75,000 or more, the amount, if any, allowed for the necessary office expenses of each officer shall be fixed by the fiscal court by an order entered upon the fiscal court order book no later than January 15 of each year. A certified copy of the orders, and of any subsequent change made therein, shall, as soon as entered, be forwarded to the department of finance.
Under KRS 64.345(2), as applicable to Jefferson County, the statute expressly states that "each sheriff's deputy who uses his own automobile in the performance of official duties shall be authorized an allotment for expenses incurred, up to a maximum of three hundred dollars ($300) per month, to be paid out of the fees and commissions of the sheriff's office. (Emphasis added).
An "allotment" suggests a fixed appropriation of money to a person or group for a particular use. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, page 24. However, the statute expressly reads: " . . . up to a maximum of three hundred dollars ($300) per month . . ." (Emphasis added).
Justice Dawson, for the court, wrote this in Old Lewis Hunter Distillery Co. v. Kentucky Tax Com'n, 302 Ky. 68, 193 S.W.2d 464 (1946) 465:
"Words used in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning unless a different intent is set forth in the statute defining the words used."
Here there are no statutory definitions available. Cf. KRS 446.010. KRS 446.080(4) provides:
"All words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.
We find no applicable statutory definitions which affect the phrase "a maximum of three hundred dollars. "
The courts have held that they are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature. See Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 4th ed., Vol. 2A, § 46.03. Justice Reed, for the Supreme Court, in United States v. Public Utilities Commission, 345 U.S. 295, 97 L. Ed. 1020, 73 S. Ct. 706, wrote this at 97 L. Ed. 1037:
"Where the language and purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of course, follow the legislative direction in interpretation. Where the words are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is likewise applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute."
Here, KRS 64.345(2) is express and is unambiguous. Further, there is no showing that the literal words would bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Under the foregoing analysis and authorities, it is our opinion that there is no statutory basis for the exceeding of the $300 per month expense allowance for deputy sheriffs of Jefferson County in the offical use of their automobiles. However, under KRS 64.346, the fiscal court of Jefferson County may pay out of its general fund for such official sheriff deputy car expense where it is shown by appropriate documentation that the maximum of $300 per month did not fully cover a deputy's actual car expense. In other words, the fiscal court could, in its discretion, if deemed necessary for the efficient operation of the sheriff's office, order such payment of county funds to a deputy using officially his automobile and thus make up the difference between the amount payable under KRS 64. 345(2) and the actual monthly expense incurred.