Request By:
Mr. Samuel E. Phillips
Taylor County Judge Executive
Courthouse
Campbellsville, Kentucky 42718
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
A citizens group has proposed that the Taylor County Fiscal Court impose an auto sticker tax, with the proceeds to be used to subsidize ambulance service in the county.
Your first question is whether or nor the fiscal court can impose such a tax?
Under §§ 170 and 181, a fiscal court can only impose two kinds of taxes for general revenue purposes: (1) an ad valorem tax; and (2) an occupational or license tax. Driver v. Sawyer, Ky., 392 S.W.2d 52 (1965).
An auto sticker tax for cities has been upheld upon the police power theory. However, such tax may be imposed under the police power where the revenue is sufficient to cover the cost of the license and cost of the supervisory regulation over the subjects thereof. See City of Mayfield v. Carter Hardware Co., 191 Ky. 364, 230 S.W. 298 (1921) 300. In a later case, Johnson v. City of Paducah, 285 Ky. 294, 147 S.W.2d 721 (1941), the court held that the revenue from such a tax could be paid into the general fund for purposes of maintaining city government.
The case of Johnson v. City of Paducah, above, held that an auto sticker or license tax was not a tax on a person's automobile, but was merely a tax imposed for the privilege of using city streets, and thus the tax related to the city's police power. KRS 67.083(3)(t) empowers a fiscal court to enact ordinances and levy taxes concerning "provision of streets and roads, bridges, tunnels and related facilities, elimination of grade crossings, provision of parking facilities, enforcement of traffic and parking regulations." We think that would authorize a fiscal court to levy an auto license tax, imposed for the privilege of regularly using county streets or roads. It would be regulatory as affecting county road traffic. Here we are speaking of county roads over which the fiscal court has jurisdiction, not city streets.
However, the courts have imposed the restriction that such license revenue must bear some reasonable relation to the administrative expense of exercising the regulatory power, such as regulating traffic on the streets. Hertz Drivurself Stations v. City of Louisville, 294 Ky. 568, 172 S.W.2d 207 (1943). The appellate court has held that where a license tax is imposed, based upon a statutorily defined police power, the courts are not inclined to declare it void, unless by its inherent character or proof it is sown to be unreasonable. Concomitantly, courts are not required to be too precise in determining what is a reasonable license fee. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. City of Lancaster, Ky., 124 S.W.2d 745 (1939) 750.
In OAG 72-318, we believed that S.B. 165, "Home Rule" (1982, Ch. 384), which created KRS 67.083, was broad enough to authorize a county car license tax. However, the statute was very broad and did not contain the detailed and express powers of later amendments to the statute (see the present KRS 67.083(3)(t)). The conclusion of OAG 72-318 as to the auto sticker tax was in effect shot down under the strict view of county powers expressed in Fiscal Court v. City of Louisville, Ky., 559 S.W.2d 478 (1977). There H.B. 165 of 1972 was declared unconstitutional as being an overly broad delegation of powers to counties. There the court stressed the necessity for express delegation of powers to counties.
CONCLUSION
1. The Fiscal Court of Taylor County may impose an automobile sticker tax under its police power, as found in KRS 67.083(3)(t).
2. The proceeds, while falling under the restrictive doctrine requiring such tax revenues as are reasonably necessary to fund the administrative cost of the exercised regulatory power, may be used to subsidize an ambulance service. Johnson v. City of Paducah, 285 Ky. 294, 147 S.W.2d 721 (1941); and KRS 67.083(3)(d). As was said in Roe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 405 S.W.2d 25 (1966) 28, a license fee imposed under the police power must not be so large as to create the imputation of a revenue measure.