Request By:
Mr. Gary D. Wainscott
Scott County Sheriff
Georgetown, Kentucky 40324
Opinion
Opinion By: Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
You request clarification on the responsibility of the sheriff in providing transportation of prisoners to receive medical attention while incarcerated in your county jail.
We pointed out in OAG 82-578 that prior to the enactment of KRS 441.500 the county jailer was required, under KRS 71.020 and 71.040, to seek adequate medical attention for prisoners in his custody actually requiring medical attention, including hospitalization. We said that, prior to KRS 441.500, KRS 71.040 implicitly required the jailer to provide for the transporting of such prisoners to the medical authorities.
However, in OAG 82-578, we concluded, as we again conclude here, that in our opinion KRS 441.500 is dispositive of this question, since it embraces "transportation of jail prisoners as necessary." (Emphasis added).
KRS 441.500 reads:
(1) If an accused is confined in a detention facility, he shall be transported as necessary in accordance with the following provisions, unless otherwise ordered by the court:
(a) If he is lodged in a city jail in the county where the trial is to be held, the city police shall carry out this duty.
(b) If he is lodged in an urban-county facility in the county where the trial is to be held, the jailer shall carry out this duty.
(c) In all other cases the sheriff of the county where the prisoner is incarcerated shall carry out this duty.
(2) If an accused is sentenced to confinement, the sheriff shall deliver him to the proper detention facility, with these exceptions:
(a) If he is sentenced to a facility which is operated by a city within the county where the trial is held, the city police shall deliver him to the proper facility.
(b) In the case of a sentence to an urbancounty detention facility, the jailer shall carry out this duty.
(3) In the event that a county contracts with another county for the incarceration of its prisoners, the jailer of the county where the trial is to be held shall be responsible for transporting prisoners to and from the county where prisoners are incarcerated, except as otherwise agreed by contract. Any expense of such transportation shall be paid from jail operating budget as provided in KRS 441.007 and 441.008.
Thus, where the prisoners are not lodged in a city jail or in an urban-county facility, but are in a county jail, the sheriff of that county, under KRS 441.500(1)(c), is required to transport prisoners needing medical attention to a physician, or surgeon, or hospital for necessary attention and treatment.
However, as we said in OAG 82-578, it is the jailer's responsibility, in such situation just described, to contact the county sheriff's office (sheriff of the county in which the jail is located) and acquaint that office with the precisely known facts concerning a particular prisoner requiring medical attention.
Our analysis is based upon the literal and general scope of the language of KRS 441.500. Apparently the General Assembly must have believed that the sheriff's office, as a general law enforcement agency, would be in a better position to transport prisoners than the jailer.
Subsection (3) of KRS 441.500 deals with the special situation of a county's contracting with another county for incarceration of its prisoners. In such special situation, the jailer, in the county of trial, by the explicit and certain terms of the subsection, is given the responsibility for transporting prisoners to and from the county where the prisoners are incarcerated, except as otherwise agreed by contract. This would include transporting the prisoners to the county of trial for medical attention and treatment. However, where the prisoners are to be taken to medical authorities in the county where the prisoners are incarcerated, such transportation of ill or injured prisoners to the medical authorities rests with the sheriff of the county of incarceration.
When looking at KRS 441.500, as a whole, and considering its clear and unambiguous language, it is our opinion that the statute must be accepted and enforced as it is written. We, and the courts, have no authority to vary the wording of the statute. Commonwealth v. Glover, 132 Ky. 588, 116 S.W. 769 (1909).