Request By:
Ms. Catherine C. Staib
General Counsel
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
123 Walnut Street
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; By: Suzanne Guss, Assistant Attorney General
This is in response to your request for an opinion of this Office regarding the interpretation of KRS 243.280 as amended by House Bill No. 738, enacted by the 1984 Session of the General Assembly.
Prior to its amendment, KRS 243.280(2) provided:
"After June 17, 1978, no malt beverage retailer's license shall be issued to sell malt beverages at retail for any premises from which gasoline and lubricating oil are sold, or from which the servicing and repair of motor vehicles is conducted unless there is maintained in inventory on the premises for sale at retail not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) of food, groceries, and related products valued at cost."
The amended version of KRS 243.280, Sections (2)-(5) effective July 13, 1984, states as follows:
"(2) No malt beverage retailer's license shall be issued to sell malt beverages at retail for any premises from which gasoline and lubricating oil are sold, or from which the servicing and repair of motor vehicles is conducted unless there is maintained in inventory on the premises for sale at retail not less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) of food, groceries and related products valued at cost.
(3) The term food and groceries referred to in subsection two (2) of this section shall mean:
(a) Any food or food product intended for human consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and hot foods and hot food products prepared for immediate consumption;
(b) Seeds and plants to grow food for personal consumption.
(4) This act shall be effective as to each malt beverage retail license which is no longer eligible for a retail malt beverage license hereunder upon the expiration of any current license issued by the state malt beverage administrator.
(5) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any licensed premises which sells no fuel other than marine fuel. " (Emphasis added).
You state in your letter that retail beer licenses for the 1984-1985 licensing year become effective July 1, 1984 and expire on June 30, 1985.
You have asked whether subsection (4) must be interpreted as a grandfather clause which, in effect, exempts from the $5,000 inventory provision those retail malt beverage licensees selling gasoline and lubricating oil, whose licenses are renewed prior to the effective date of the amendment.
The answer is "no." Only the requirements of "This act", i.e. the amendments provided by the enactment of House Bill No. 738, are effective as to each malt beverage retail license "which is no longer eligible for a retail malt beverage license" upon expiration of any current license. Included in the amendments is the statutory definition of "food and groceries" which differs somewhat from the definition set forth in 804 KAR 4:125. For the person whose license is issued or renewed prior to the effective date of the amendments, "food and groceries" are defined by 804 KAR 4:125. For the person whose license is renewed after the effective date of the amendment, the terms "food and groceries" are defined by KRS 243.280(3). The $5,000 inventory provision applies to all licensees at all times.
You have also asked what enforcement powers does the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board have against a retail malt beverage licensee, selling gasoline and lubricating oil, who has an active license on the effective date of House Bill No. 738, and fails to maintain the $5,000 inventory during the 1984-1985 license year. In view of the answer provided to the first question presented, such person is subject to all penalties listed in KRS 243.990(1), in addition to license revocation.
The phrase "This act", in KRS 243.280(4) must be interpreted to refer to the amendments of the statute and not the entire statute. To interpret the language of KRS 243.280(4), one must be guided by the intention of the
Legislature. Commonwealth v. Carroll County Fiscal Court, Ky.App., 633 S.W.2d 720 (1982);
Kentucky Region Eight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 489 (1974). The legislative intent of KRS 243.280 is clear from subsection (2). Any other construction of the term "Act" in KRS 243.280(4) would essentially render subsection (2) meaningless. Such construction is to be avoided.
Transport Motor Express, Inc. v. Finn, 574 S.W.2d 277 (1978). A statute must be construed so that no part is rendered meaningless.
Brooks v. Meyers, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 764 (1955).
The above-stated construction of KRS 243.280(4) preserves the effect and intent of subsection (2) and the authority of the Board to pursue all available remedies.