Request By:
Mr. James R. Gildersleeve
Court Administrator
Warren Circuit Court
Eighth Judicial Circuit
Courthouse - P.O. Box 3000
Bowling Green, Kentucky 42101
Opinion
Opinion By: David L. Armstrong, Attorney General; By: Charles W. Runyan, Assistant Deputy Attorney General
Your office requests a formal opinion concerning juror qualification. KRS 29A.070 directs that a juror qualification form be mailed or delivered with the summons to each juror. The prospective juror is required to accurately and faithfully fill out the form and return it by mail or hand delivery to the circuit clerk within five (5) days after its receipt, or to be completed as otherwise directed. The Administrative Office of the Courts designed the juror form (AOC-79-005). The form is so designed that the proper filling out of the form may, in a particular juror's situation, reflect a statutory disqualification or disqualifications, especially as reflected in the disqualifications listed in KRS 29A.080.
KRS 29A.080(2)(h) (as amended in 1982) provides that a prospective juror is disqualified to serve on a jury if he: "Has served on a jury within the past twelve (12) months." (Emphasis added). The AOC juror qualification form contains this question: "Have you served as a juror in a Kentucky State Court within the past twelve months?" (Emphasis added). The statute uses the term "a jury", while the AOC form uses the qualifying language "a juror in a Kentucky State Court."
You have written that the judges of the Eighth Judicial Circuit interpret KRS 29A.080(2)(h) to mean a jury of either the state or federal system within the past twelve (12) months. In addition, we note the rather stern provision of KRS 29A.080(3), which provides that the judge of the court, in drawing up his jury list, cannot waive any of the disqualifications in order to allow a prospective juror to serve. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, Ky.App., 657 S.W.2d 244 (1983) 245. The situation you present is especially a problem in cities in which both state and federal jurors are empaneled.
Question No. 1:
"Does KRS 29A.080(2)(h) mean prior service in State Court only or any prior service (including Federal) within the past twelve months?"
In Bailey v. Reeves, Ky., 662 S.W.2d 832 (1984) 834, the Supreme Court wrote:
"We have a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion."
Elsewhere in Bailey v. Reeves, above, the court said this:
"Instead we are required to give the words of the statute written by the legislature their plain meaning. To do so restricts us from adding restrictive language to KRS 304.39-230(6) where it does not now exist." (Emphasis added).
The plain meaning of the term "a jury", standing alone, is simply any jury, State or Federal. There is no ambiguity involved. However, the AOC form uses the phrase "juror in a Kentucky State Court," and it thereby imposes restrictive language upon the statute, i.e., when KRS 29A.080(2)(h) is viewed in isolation.
However, and notwithstanding the literal implications of KRS 29A.080(2)(h), as an isolated statute, "a jury" can only make sense in terms of a "jury of a court." Here, in KRS 29A.080(2)(h), the term "a jury" is spelled out, while the inevitable term "of a court", as a modifier of "jury", is elliptical, but nonetheless a legal reality. Now at this point we find that KRS 29A.010(1) defines "court" as meaning a circuit or district court of this Commonwealth and includes any judges of these courts. Thus prior jury service, by way of this final analysis, under KRS 29A.080(2)(h), refers to jury service in a State Court only.
Question No. 2:
'If the answer is any prior service (including Federal) should the AOC-79-005 form be revised to adopt the exact wording of KRS 29A.080(2)(h)?"
Our answer is that we believe that the AOC form correctly states the statutory law.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is our opinion that the definition of "court" in KRS 29A.010 directs the AOC's restricting the service on a jury to a jury of the State Court system.
The old Court of Appeals, in George Wohrley, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Rev., Ky., 495 S.W.2d 173 (1973) 174, wrote that "When a statute defines words used therein we look to the legislative definition rather than the dictionaries or common usage." The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Schroader v. Atkins, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 945 (1983) 947, ruled that "When the General Assembly specifically provides that a word used in a statute shall have a particular meaning, the courts must accept that statutory definition in construing the statute even though the statutory definition is quite different from the ordinary meaning of the word." Thus the courts are bound by the definition of "court" in KRS 29A.010, as used in KRS Chapter 29A. That is dispositive of this matter.
See Spanski v. Com., Ky., 610 S.W.2d 290 (1980), in which the court stressed that the disqualification statute, KRS 29A.080, and as relates to prior jury service, relates to the prospective juror's ability to be on a jury panel, citing KRS 29A.080, 29A.010, et seq., and KRS 29A.130. If the General Assembly desires that KRS 29A.080(2)(h) cover jury service in the Kentucky court system and the federal system in Kentucky, it can easily amend that statute.