Request By:
Hon. Hanson Williams
Staff Attorney
Office of Legal Services
Kentucky Department of Education
500 Mero Street
Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General; Anne E. Keating, Assistant Attorney General
In your recent letter you requested an opinion from this office on behalf of the Education Professional Standards Board interpreting KRS 161.120(3)(c). In particular, you ask, "[D]oes a revocation of a teacher's certificate which is voted upon by the Education Professional Standards Board require a majority vote of all its members, or a majority vote of those who constitute a quorum to hear the evidence?"
It is the opinion of this office that, based on KRS 161.120(3)(c), upon hearing the evidence concerning possible revocation of a certificate, the Education Professional Standards Board may act so long as a majority of the membership of the Board is present and renders its decision or defers action for no more than five days.
This interpretation complies with KRS 61.805 which addresses open meetings of public agencies. "Meeting" is defined in KRS 61.805(1) to include a gathering of any kind regardless of where held; "public agency" is defined in KRS 61.805(2) as including boards; "action taken" is defined in KRS 61.805(3) to include collective decisions or "an actual vote by a majority of the members of the governmental body." In other words, the quorum, or a majority of the board, which is required for the board to carry out business, also constitutes the number of members needed for action to be taken by that board. Naturally, the vote by a majority of the membership of the board may be split with the result being that a majority of the quorum will determine the action of that board.
You point out that KRS 160.270 states that "a concurring vote by a majority of the board, the number of board members in the quorum notwithstanding, shall be necessary to take any particular action unless otherwise specified by statute." If the legislature had wished to require that the language of KRS 160.270, which is applicable to local boards of education, should apply to KRS 161.120, which is applicable to the Education Professional Standards Board, then language easily could have been included in the latter statute. When the General Assembly adopts a statute, it is considered to be aware of previous enactments on the same subject.
Miller v. Jones, Ky. App., 658 S.W.2d 888 (1983).
It is our conclusion that the Education Professional Standards Board, as a public agency, may meet to take action so long as a majority of the members are present and express themselves by vote. KRS 161.120 provides that a majority of the board may take official action upon hearing the evidence presented, and it would not be appropriate to require that additional members who are not present and did not hear the evidence should render a vote. It is clear that the quorum necessary for the board to conduct business may also act. The Education Professional Standards Board, composed of fifteen members, may act when eight members are present to hear the evidence and to take action; that action may consist of a vote of which a majority of those present prevail over the rest.