Request By:
Mr. Clarence E. Salyer
Assistant Director
Division of Pupil Attendance
Kentucky Department of Education
Capital Plaza Tower
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
Opinion
Opinion By: Frederic J. Cowan, Attorney General; Anne E. Keating, Assistant Attorney General
In your letter to this office on behalf of the Kentucky Department of Education, Division of Pupil Attendance, you have requested an official clarification of the definition of "truancy" and especially the definition of an "habitual truant" as they are defined in KRS 159.150, 600.020(24), and referenced in 630.020.
You asked that the opinion reconcile the definitions, if possible, so that Directors of Pupil Personnel and Court Designated Workers may operate from a consistent definition.
KRS 159.150, most recently enacted in 1990, states:
Any child who has been absent from school without valid excuse for three (3) or more days, or tardy on three (3) or more days, is a truant. Any child who has been reported as a truant three (3) or more times is an habitual truant. Being absent for less than half of a school day shall be regarded as being tardy.
The Unified Juvenile Code includes Chapters 600-645 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. KRS 600.020(24), most recently passed in 1988, states:
As used in KRS Chapters 600 to 645, unless the context otherwise requires:
(24) 'Habitual truant' means any child who has been found by the court to have been absent from school without valid excuse for three (3) or more days during a one (1) year period or tardy for three (3) or more days on at least three (3) occasions during a one (1) year period.
KRS 630.020, most recently passed in 1988, states, in pertinent part,
The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child living, or found within the district, who allegedly . . . (3) [h]as been an habitual truant from school.
KRS 610.010(1)(c), most recently passed in 1988, is also relevant to your inquiry, and states:
Unless otherwise exempted by KRS Chapters 600 to 645, the juvenile session of the district court of each county shall have exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child living or found within the county who has not reached his eighteenth birthday or of any person who at the time of committing a public offense was under the age of eighteen (18) years, who allegedly:
(c) Is an habitual truant from school. . . .
Kentucky courts have held that where words in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written.
Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 456 (1970). Under the plain language of these statutes, it is the opinion of this Office that KRS 159.150 and KRS 600.020(24) set forth definitions of "habitual truant" that are individually clear and unambiguous, but when compared to each other are inconsistent in part.
Under KRS 159.150, a child who is absent without valid excuse or tardy three or more days is a truant; a child who is truant three or more times is an habitual truant. Simple mathematics results in an habitual truant being a child who has been absent or tardy nine or more times. In contrast, under KRS 600.020(24), an habitual truant includes a child who has been found by the court to be absent from school without valid excuse for three or more days in one year; an habitual truant is also a child who has been found by the court to be tardy for three or more days on at least three occasions during a one year period which, again, results in nine or more times. The defintion in KRS 600.020(24) is, therefore, more stringent than the definition in KRS 159.150.
While the two definitions of "habitual truant" cannot be reconciled in terms of their language, it may be possible to reconcile them in their application. KRS 159.140 gives Directors of Pupil Personnel authority to enforce compulsory attendance laws, including KRS 159.150. Penalties are set forth under KRS 159.990 and are enforced by the District Court. Through exclusive jurisdiction over habitual truants the District Court has discretion in enforcement. The Court may either rely on a Director of Pupil Personnel to initiate proceedings for violations of KRS 159.150, or the Court may order a Director of Pupil Personnel to enforce KRS 600.020(24), in which case the Director would have authority to apply the definition found therein. The Department of Education may wish to enter into dialogue with the district courts on this issue.