Request By:
Kenneth Isaacs
P.O. Box 201
McKee, KY 40447Dwight K. Bishop, Mayor
City of McKee
P.O. Box 455
McKee, KY 40447James T. Gilbert
McKee City Attorney
212 N. 2nd Street
Richmond, KY 40475
Opinion
Opinion By: Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General; Amye L. Bensenhaver, Assistant Attorney General
Open Meetings Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether the McKee City Council violated the Open Meetings Act at regular meetings held between January 1999 and September 2002 by failing to establish a schedule of regular meetings as required by KRS 61.820. For the reasons that follow, we find that the record before us does not support the claimed violation.
On October 21, 2002, Kenneth Isaacs submitted a complaint to the McKee City Council in which he alleged that because the council failed to amend the applicable ordinance to reflect that its regular meetings would begin at 7:00 p.m., rather than at 6:00 p.m. as provided for in the original ordinance, "every regular city council meeting that has been held from January 1999 thru September 2002 that was called to order at any time other than 6:00 P.M. has violated the Open Meetings Act. " As a means of remedying the alleged violation, Mr. Isaacs proposed that the council declare these meetings "null and void," or alternatively that the entire city council "resign immediately." Having received no response to his complaint, Mr. Isaacs initiated this appeal on October 29, 2002.
In correspondence directed to this office following commencement of Mr. Isaacs's appeal, City Attorney James T. Gilbert denied the allegations leveled against the council. He advised:
It appears that Mr. Isaacs is complaining that there is no ordinance providing that the McKee City Council meet at 7:00 p.m., rather than 6:00 p.m. Further, he contends that as a result all council meetings have been in violation of the act and that his suggested remedy is for the Mayor and the entire City Council to resign immediately. Predictably, the City made no response to Mr. Isaacs' complaint.
. . .
As I read Mr. Isaacs' complaint, there is no indication that the McKee City Council met in secret or otherwise in a fashion which was not open to the public. There is no indication that Mr. Isaacs was unaware of the time of the regular meetings of the City Council. I see no provision in the Open Meetings Act for the remedy he suggests, resignation by the Mayor and existing City Council.
In support of the council's position, Mr. Gilbert provided this office with a copy of City of McKee Code § 32.22, establishing the regular meeting of the city council at 7:00 p.m. on the third Monday of each month.
We should note that KRS 61.846(1) requires an agency response to an open meetings complaint in writing, and within three business days. A letter directed to the Attorney General following initiation of an open meetings appeal does not satisfy the statutory requirement found at KRS 61.846(1). The fact that a complaint is devoid of merit does not excuse compliance with the statute.
Turning to the substantive issue in this appeal, we note that KRS 61.820 provides:
All meetings of all public agencies of this state, and any committees or subcommittees thereof, shall be held at specified times and places which are convenient to the public, and all public agencies shall provide for a schedule of regular meetings by ordinance, order, resolution, bylaws, or by whatever other means may be required for the conduct of business of that public agency. The schedule of regular meetings shall be made available to the public.
The McKee City Council has done so in adopting § 32.22 of its code of ordinances, providing that its regular meeting "shall be held at 7:00 p.m. on the third Monday of each month in Council Chambers of City Hall." As long as the council's regular meetings are conducted at this time, and in this place, we find no violation of the cited provision.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General should be notified of any action in circuit court, but should not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceeding.