Opinion
Opinion By: Andy Beshear,Attorney General;James M. Herrick,Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Decision
The question presented in this appeal is whether Louisville Metro Government ("LMG") violated the Kentucky Open Records Act by redacting certain identifying information for specific juvenile offenders from a copy of the Louisville Metro Youth Detention Center's booking log. For the reasons that follow, we find procedural violations, but no substantive violation of the Act.
On March 22, 2019, Ms. Howard requested a copy of the booking log from the detention center, operated by Louisville Metro Youth Detention Services ("YDS"), from September 1, 2017, to the present. She specifically omitted "names [and] identifying or protected information" from the scope of her request. LMG responded on March 28, 2019, one day later than the three business days allowed by KRS 61.880(1). Accordingly, we find a procedural violation of the Act arising from the untimely response.
In its response, LMG provided the booking log, but indicated that the "inmate number," "booking number," and "race" columns had been redacted pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(a), 1 as well as KRS 610.320 and 610.340, which were incorporated into the Open Records Act by KRS 61.878(1)(l). 2 Ms. Howard initiated this appeal on April 3, 2019, arguing: (1) that LMG had failed to explain the application of the exceptions to the Act; (2) that the redacted information could not invade personal privacy because it was merely "statistical" and non-identifying; and (3) that KRS 610.320 and 610.340 "pertain to juvenile court records only" and thus were inapplicable.
We agree with Ms. Howard that LMG's response was deficient under the Act. KRS 61.880(1) requires an agency's denial of inspection to include both "a statement of the specific exception authorizing the withholding of the record" and "a brief explanation of how the exception applies to the record withheld. " Although LMG cited the exceptions on which it relied, its response contained no explanation of how they applied to the specific records. Thus, LMG committed another procedural violation of the Act. 16-ORD-261.
Substantively, however, we find that KRS 610.320(3) controls in this case. That subsection provides:
All law enforcement and court records regarding children who have not reached their eighteenth birthday shall not be opened to scrutiny by the public , except that a separate public record shall be kept by the clerk of the court which shall be accessible to the public for court records, limited to the petition, order of the adjudication, and disposition in juvenile delinquency proceedings concerning a child who is fourteen (14) years of age or order at the time of the commission of the offense, and who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for the commission of an offense that would constitute a capital offense or a Class A, B, or C felony if the juvenile were an adult, or any offense involving a deadly weapon, or an offense wherein a deadly weapon is used or displayed.
(Emphasis added.) KRS 610.320(3) is "aimed at protecting juvenile offenders. " 09-ORD-201 (emphasis omitted). Although Ms. Howard argues that this statute applies only to court records, it also applies by its express terms to "law enforcement" records. We therefore need not decide whether the records of YDS are "court records," if they are law enforcement records for purposes of KRS 610.320(3).
Finding no applicable statutory definition of "law enforcement records," we are guided by a previous decision of this office construing the language in KRS 61.878(1)(h), an open records exception applying to "[r]ecords of law enforcement agencies . . . compiled in the process of detecting and investigating statutory or regulatory violations." In 93-ORD-102, we stated in dicta that the Daviess County Detention Center might successfully invoke KRS 61.878(1)(h) 3 as a law enforcement agency to protect its own records if it were conducting an investigation of a statutory violation. Given that detention center records are considered "[r]ecords of law enforcement agencies" for purposes of KRS 61.878(1)(h), we conclude that records of a youth detention center pertaining to specific juvenile offenders are "law enforcement . . . records regarding children" within the meaning of KRS 610.320(3).
KRS 610.320(3) "is unquestionably incorporated into the Open Records Act by operation of KRS 61.878(1)(l)." 10-ORD-066. On appeal, LMG states that "the inmate number and booking number and race" of individual inmates are "necessary" information for YDS "to identify . . . the identity of each juvenile. " LMG further explains the function of the booking log: "[W]hen a law enforcement officer criminally charges a juvenile, they are booked into YDS using the information from law enforcement records. Once a juvenile is criminally charged, they are brought to YDS and upon booking, assigned an inmate number; this inmate number is specifically assigned to one individual and will be used anytime that individual is booked into YDS again." We therefore find that LMG has sufficiently explained how the redacted fields constitute records referring specifically to individual juveniles.
With regard to KRS 61.878(1)(a), it is possible that the three fields LMG redacted would constitute identifying information appropriate for "categorical redaction" under Kentucky New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville, 415 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2013). Since we find KRS 610.320(3) dispositive, however, it is unnecessary to analyze the privacy interest under KRS 61.878(1)(a). Accordingly, we find no substantive violation of the Open Records Act.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating action in the appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in any subsequent proceedings.
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