25-OMD-020
January 28, 2025
In re: Tanyqua Oliver/Fayette County Board of Education
Summary: The Fayette County Board of Education (“the Board”) did
not violate the Open Meetings Act (“the Act”) when it held a private
reception prior to its official meeting. The Board also did not violate the
Act when it requested that the Appellant modify her behavior but did
not require that she leave the meeting. The Office is unable to resolve
the factual disputes between the parties regarding whether the
Appellant received the Board’s response to her complaint.
Open Meetings Decision
Tanyqua Oliver (“Appellant”) submitted a complaint to Fayette County Public
School (“FCPS”) personnel claiming that, at its December 19, 2024, meeting, it
“violated KRS 61.840 in regard to conditions of attendance.” Specifically, the
Appellant alleges she was “followed and harassed by FCPS police officers.” Having
received no response from the Board, the Appellant initiated this appeal.1
Upon receiving a complaint alleging a violation of the Act, a “public agency
shall determine within three (3) [business] days . . . after the receipt of the complaint
1
Although the Appellant’s complaint names FCPS as the alleged violator of the Act, it complains of
actions taken at the Board’s December 19, 2024, meeting. Accordingly, the Board is the agency which
is the subject of this appeal. However, the Appellant claims she submitted her complaint by hand to
FCPS police officers at the December 19 meeting and by e-mail to the Superintendent of FCPS. Under
KRS 61.846(1), a complainant must “submit a written complaint to the presiding officer of the public
agency suspected of” violating the Act. Whether the Appellant complied with KRS 61.846(1) matters
because, to invoke the Attorney General’s review under KRS 61.846(2), a complainant “shall begin
enforcement” under KRS 61.846(1). Here, it does not appear that the Appellant submitted her
complaint to the presiding officer of the Board. However, the Board has not asserted that the Appellant
failed to submit her complaint to the Board’s presiding officer. Moreover, the Board claims that its
Chair did receive and timely respond to the Appellant’s complaint. Thus, the Office is satisfied that it
has jurisdiction to review the Appellant’s complaint regarding the Board.whether to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint and shall notify
in writing the person making the complaint, within the three (3) day period, of its
decision.” KRS 61.846(1). Here, the Appellant submitted her complaint to the Board
on December 19 and 20 but, as of January 13, she had yet to receive a response to
that complaint. In response, the District asserts it responded to her complaint on
December 26, 2024.2 In appeals under the Act, the Office cannot resolve factual
disputes between the parties. See, e.g., 23-OMD-339; 22-OMD-236 (“this Office cannot
decide factual disputes in this forum”); 19-OMD-187. Thus, the Office cannot resolve
this factual dispute between the parties regarding whether the Appellant received
the Board’s response to her complaint.
Regarding the merits of the Appellant’s allegations against the Board, the
Appellant alleges the Board violated the Act when it imposed “conditions of
attendance” by not allowing her to sit in public areas prior to the meeting and when
FCPS police officers “physically assaulted [her] by bumping” her. The purpose of the
Act is to ensure the formation of public policy “shall not be conducted in secret.”
KRS 61.800. It is for this reason that “[n]o condition other than those required for the
maintenance of order shall apply to the attendance of any member of the public at
any meeting of a public agency [and] [n]o person may be required to identify himself
in order to attend any such meeting.” KRS 61.840.
To start, the Board explains that, prior to its December 19 meeting, it held a
reception for two former Board members whose terms had expired. The Board states
that the Appellant entered that room during the reception, she was informed where
the meeting would take place, and she “voluntarily left the reception.” Under
KRS 61.810(1), “[a]ll meetings of a quorum of the members of any public agency at
which any public business is discussed or at which any action is taken by the agency,
shall be public meetings, open to the public at all times” (emphasis added). However,
“[t]he mere fact that a quorum of members of a public agency are in the same place
at the same time, without more, is not sufficient to sustain a claim of violation of the
Act.” Yeoman v. Commonwealth, Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 474 (Ky. 1998).
The Appellant does not allege that the Board discussed public business or took any
action at its pre-meeting reception. Accordingly, the Board did not violate the Act
when it held a reception that was not open to the Appellant.
Next, regarding the Appellant’s allegations regarding the FCPS police officers,
the Board admits that “officers observed Ms. Oliver’s behavior during the Board’s
meeting,” “stood or sat near [a Board member] to support her in response to Ms.
2
The Board provided the Office with a copy of its December 26 response.Oliver’s behavior,” and asked her “to stop after she extended her arm across a table
and into” a Board member’s face. But the Board also asserts that the Appellant was
not asked to leave the meeting, was allowed to “continue recording” and to “roam
freely around the room,” and was allowed to address the Board during the public
comment period. As explained above, the Office is not able to resolve factual disputes
regarding allegations of being “bumped” during the meeting. See, e.g., 22-OMD-236.3
However, the Appellant does not claim she was made to leave the Board’s December
19 meeting. The Office has previously declined to find that a public agency imposed
conditions on attendance in violation of the Act when it asked an attendee to identify
herself but did not make the attendee leave when she declined to do so. See, e.g., 24-
OMD-215. Here, too, the Board did not violate the Act when it asked the Appellant
to modify her behavior but did not require her to leave the meeting.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ Matthew Ray
Matthew Ray
Assistant Attorney General
#025
Distributed to:
Tanyqua Oliver
Andria Jackson
Demetrus Liggins
Alex Garcia
3
Moreover, the Office is limited to addressing disputes regarding violations of the Act. See
KRS 61.846. The Office cannot resolve the Appellant’s claim of having been “physically assaulted.”