25-ORD-013
January 14, 2025
In re: Kentucky Public Radio/Louisville Metro Police Department
Summary: The Louisville Metro Police Department (“the Department”)
subverted the intent of the Open Records Act (“the Act”), within the
meaning of KRS 61.880(4), when it delayed access to requested records
for six months without proper justification.
Open Records Decision
On December 5, 2024, Kentucky Public Radio (“the Appellant”) submitted a
request to the Department for “any and all body camera footage pertaining to” a
specific citation issued on September 27, 2024.1 In response, the Department invoked
KRS 61.872(5) by stating the requested record had been located but was “not . . .
available” because it was “expected to contain a mixture of exempt and non-exempt
information,” the review and redaction process was estimated to take seven minutes
for each minute of video, only four individuals were assigned to perform that task,
and the Department had “an estimated 1,000+ pending requests for video.” After the
Appellant complained that a delay of six months was unreasonable, the Department
replied that “[t]he six-month language” was merely “the standard message [it] send[s]
on every request for video,” the “average wait” for video requests was “around two
months,” and it was “likely” the redaction process for the requested video would begin
“within the next month.” This appeal followed.
Upon receiving a request to inspect records, a public agency must decide within
five business days whether to grant or deny the request. KRS 61.880(1). A public
agency may delay access to responsive records beyond five business days if such
records are “in active use, storage, or not otherwise available.” KRS 61.872(5). A
public agency that invokes KRS 61.872(5) to delay access to responsive records must
also notify the requester of the earliest date on which the records will be available,
and provide a detailed explanation for the cause of the delay.
1 The Appellant also requested a copy of the citation. That portion of the request does not appear to
be at issue in this appeal.A requester who believes the agency’s delay is unreasonable may seek the
Attorney General’s review by alleging the agency subverted the intent of the Act by
“delay past the five (5) day period described in [KRS 61.880(1)].” KRS 61.880(4). In
determining how much delay is reasonable, the Office has considered the number of
records the requester has sought, the location of the records, and the content of the
records. See, e.g., 22-ORD-176; 01-ORD-140; OAG 92-117. Weighing these factors is
a fact-intensive analysis. See 21-ORD-045. Ultimately, the agency bears the burden
of proof to sustain its action. KRS 61.880(2)(c).
Here, the Appellant submitted a request to the Department, and in response,
the Department invoked KRS 61.872(5) to delay the Appellant’s access to the public
records for six months. As justification for the delay, the Department stated it was
necessary to redact the video, only four technicians were assigned to that task, and a
large number of other requests for video were pending. Although the Department
estimated it would take seven minutes to process each minute of footage, it did not
state how many minutes of video were implicated by the Appellant’s request.
While many unrelated, simultaneous requests to inspect records may place a
strain on a public agency, “[n]either the volume of unrelated requests nor staffing
issues justifies a delayed response.” See 19-ORD-188 n.1; see also 24-ORD-063; 22-
ORD-167. Here, in its response to the request, the Department admitted that “[s]ome
requests take as little as 30 minutes to an hour to complete, while some can take over
a week.” Thus, no single request takes the Department six months to process. In 23-
ORD-328, the Office found the exact same justifications offered here by the
Department did not substantiate a delay of six months to provide the requested video.
Here, likewise, the Department has not met its burden under KRS 61.880(2)(c) to
justify a six-month delay to respond to the Appellant’s request.2 Accordingly, the
Department subverted the intent of the Act, within the meaning if KRS 61.880(4),
when it delayed access to records beyond the five-day period under KRS 61.880(1).
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
2 On appeal, the Department states the requested record consists of “a video two and one-half hours
in length,” which it redacted in four hours’ time and provided to the Appellant on December 13, 2024,
two days after this appeal was initiated. Because it has now provided the record, the Department
claims the appeal is moot. However, “[i]f a person feels the intent of [the Act] is being subverted by an
agency short of denial of inspection, including but not limited to . . . delay past the five (5) day period
described in [KRS 61.880(1)] . . . the person may complain in writing to the Attorney General, and the
complaint shall be subject to the same adjudicatory process as if the record had been denied.” KRS
61.880(4). Here, the Appellant brought this appeal claiming the Department had engaged in
unreasonable delay, which the Office construes as a claim of subversion under KRS 61.880(4). As such,
the appeal is not moot with respect to Metro’s unreasonable delay. See, e.g., 24-ORD-015 n.3.be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ James M. Herrick
James M. Herrick
Assistant Attorney General
#508
Distributed to:
Ms. Sylvia Goodman
Anne Courtney Coorssen, Esq.
Alice Lyon, Esq.
Nicole Pang, Esq.
Natalie S. Johnson, Esq.
Annale R. Taylor, Esq.