25-ORD-119
May 13, 2025
In re: EWU Media/Louisville Metro Government
Summary: Louisville Metro Government (“Metro”) did not violate the
Open Records Act (“the Act”) when it denied a request for public records
on the basis of the requester’s residency.
Open Records Decision
EWU Media (“Appellant”) submitted two requests to Metro on January 25 and
February 10, 2025. Both requests sought various investigative records related to two
criminal investigations. In response to the January 25 request, Metro determined the
request was for a commercial purpose, and thus charged a higher fee for copies of the
records under KRS 61.874(5). Four days later, Metro issued an additional denial
because it found the Appellant is not a resident of the Commonwealth, as the term is
defined by KRS 61.870(10). In response to the February 10 request, Metro denied the
request as being for a commercial purpose. This appeal followed.
Under KRS 61.872(2)(a), “[a]ny resident of the Commonwealth shall have the
right to inspect public records.” “A requester must fit the definition of ‘resident of the
Commonwealth’ at the time his request is made.” 25-ORD-018. KRS 61.870(10)(g)
defines “resident of the Commonwealth” to include a “news-gathering organization”
defined in KRS 189.635(9)(b). The Appellant, in its original requests and on appeal,
asserts that it qualifies as a “news-gathering organization” because it is “[a]n online-
only newspaper or magazine that publishes news or opinion of interest to a general
audience . . . .” KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.e. (emphasis added).
To determine whether the Appellant qualifies as a resident of the
Commonwealth, we start with the text of the Act. To qualify as a “news-gathering
organization” under KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.e, the entity must: (1) be online-only; (2) be
a newspaper or magazine; (3) publish news or opinion (4) that is of interest to ageneral audience; and (5) not be affiliated with any entity described in
KRS 196.635(9)(b)2. Metro does not dispute that the Appellant satisfies the first and
fifth of these elements. Instead, it argues that the Appellant does not satisfy elements
2, 3, and 4.
As described in its requests and on appeal, at the time the request was made,
the Appellant published its material and videos on Facebook and YouTube, which
could be accessed via links on the Appellant’s website. Metro states the Appellant’s
“Facebook, YouTube channel, and website contain only ‘true crime’ summaries using
video and audio taken directly from law enforcement case files and supplemented
with superimposed text, video effects, sound effects, and dramatic voice overs.”
Further, Metro points to a disclaimer contained in all the Appellant’s posted videos,
which states, “All information contained in this video presentation is provided for
entertainment purposes only. . . .” The Appellant does not dispute Metro’s assertions
that it is focused solely on “true crime.” Instead, it asserts the Act does not “exclude[ ]
crime-focused journalism from the definition of news-gathering organizations.”1
However, the Act does limit the definition of news-gathering organization under
KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.e. to entities that “publish[ ] news or opinion of interest to a
general audience.”
Here, it is not immediately clear that an entity that re-tells the stories of
salacious crimes “for entertainment purposes only” is publishing “news or opinion.”
And, even if such material qualifies as “news or opinion,” it is not apparent that “true
crime” stories are “of interest to a general audience.” By limiting the
KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.e. definition of news-gathering organization to entities that
publish news or opinion “of interest to a general audience,” the Act makes clear that
not just any published “news or opinion” qualifies the entity as a news-gathering
organization.2 Ultimately, however, the Office need not decide today whether an
1
The Appellant also asserts that an agency must accept the requester’s statement that it is a “news-
gathering organization.” The Office has previously stated that an agency may not demand proof of the
requester’s residency status. See, e.g., 22-ORD-120. Here, however, the Metro did not demand proof of
the Appellant’s residency status. Rather, it disagreed with the Appellant’s assessment of itself and
issued a denial. The Office has previously found an agency’s denial does not violate the Act when the
record on appeal demonstrates that the requester was not a resident of the Commonwealth at the time
of the request. See, e.g., 25-ORD-018 (finding the requester was not a resident of the Commonwealth);
24-ORD-238 (same).
2
Indeed, KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.f. includes in the definition of “news-gathering organization” “[a]ny
other entity that publishes news content by any means to the general public . . . .” However, such
entities are not included in the definition of “resident of the Commonwealth” under the Act.
KRS 61.870(10)(g) (including only news-gathering organizations “as defined in KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.a.
to e.” in the definition of “resident of the Commonwealth”).entity that only publishes “true-crime” content “publishes news or opinion of interest
to a general audience.” KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.e. also requires the entity to be a
“newspaper or magazine.” The record before the Office makes clear that the Appellant
is neither.
The Act does not define newspaper or magazine. Under KRS 446.080(4) “[a]ll
words and phrases” used in the Kentucky Revised Statutes “shall be construed
according to the common and approved usage of language,” except for “technical
words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate
meaning in the law.” A newspaper is “a paper that is printed and distributed usually
daily or weekly and that contains news, articles of opinion, features, and advertising,”
and a magazine is a “print periodical containing miscellaneous pieces (such as
articles, stories, poems) and often illustrated.”3
Relevant here, both definitions clearly encompass entities with a focus on
printed materials. The record in this appeal makes clear that, at the time of the
request, the Appellant published its content with videos. Simply publishing or re-
publishing videos on YouTube or Facebook does not turn an individual or entity into
a “newspaper or magazine” as defined by the Act.4 As such, because the Appellant
was not a newspaper or magazine at the time it made its requests, Metro’s responses
to those requests did not violate the Act.5
3
See
Newspaper,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
available
at
https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/newspaper (last visited May, 2, 2025); Magazine, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
available at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/magazine (last visited May, 13, 2025). The
Office has previously referred to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary when determining the common
meaning of words not defined by the Act. See, e.g., 20-ORD-061; 08-ORD-140.
4
The Appellant asserts that Metro’s “archaic, print-centric definition of journalism . . . fails to
recognize how news is delivered in the digital age.” But the issue is not how news is delivered in the
digital age; what is at issue here is the meaning of the words the General Assembly chose to use in the
Act. The text of the Act does not include just any digital publication in the definition of “news-gathering
organization.” See KRS 61.870(10)(g) (excluding from the definition of “resident of the Commonwealth”
“[a]ny other entity that publishes news content by any means to the general public. . .”). Further, the
Appellant argues that an agency may not deny a request based on its determination of whether the
requester is or is not a “news-gathering organization” without violating the United States and
Kentucky Constitutions. That question is beyond the scope of the Office’s review in this appeal. Here,
the Office’s analysis is limited to whether Metro violated the Act. See KRS 61.880(2)(a).
5
Under KRS 61.872(2)(a), only a “resident of the Commonwealth” has the “right to inspect public
records.” Because a nonresident has no statutory right of inspection, a public agency cannot violate
the Act by denying a nonresident’s request—regardless of the reason it provides when denying the
request. Thus, the Office cannot find that Metro violated the Act when it denied both the Appellant’s
requests on the grounds that they were made for a commercial purpose.A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court under KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days from
the date of this decision. Under KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall be notified
of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in
any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of the complaint
emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General
#096
Distributed to:
Mike Abate, Esq.
Rick Adams Esq.
Alice Lyon, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Nicole Pang, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Anne Coorsen, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Annale Taylor, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney