25-ORD-139
May 27, 2025
In re: Bobby Ellison/City of London
Summary: The Office cannot find that the City of London (“the City”)
violated the Open Records Act (“the Act”) because the Office is unable to
resolve the factual dispute between the parties regarding whether the
Appellant resided in Laurel County at the time of his request.
Open Records Decision
Bobby Ellison (“Appellant”) submitted a request to the City for a database
logging all records requests the city received between January 1, 2025, and April 1,
2025. In response, the City stated that, because the Appellant is a resident of the
Laurel County, it was electing to require him to inspect the records in person before
receiving copies. This appeal followed.
Under KRS 61.872(2)(a), “[a]ny resident of the Commonwealth shall have the
right to inspect public records.” Inspection of public records on the agency’s premises
is the basic right provided by the Act. “Upon inspection, the applicant shall have the
right . . . to obtain copies of all public records not exempted by the terms of
KRS 61.878.” KRS 61.874(1) (emphasis added). Thus, under KRS 61.874(1), a
requester’s right to obtain copies of records is conditioned on his prior inspection of
those records. See, e.g., OAG 76-375 (finding that “[t]he right to have copies of records
is ancillary to the right of inspection and does not stand by itself,” and therefore, “[i]f
a person has not inspected the records he desires to copy[,] there is no requirement
that copies of any records must be delivered to him”); OAG 82-629 (finding that the
Act “does not contemplate that a public agency shall send requested records to a
person who has not inspected them”).
In 1992, the General Assembly enacted KRS 61.872(3), which provides that
public records may be inspected either “[d]uring the regular office hours of the publicagency” or “[b]y receiving copies of the public records from the public agency through
the mail.” The second alternative, however, is not available to all requesters. Rather,
“[t]he public agency shall mail copies of the public records to a person whose residence
or principal place of business is outside the county in which the public records are
located after he or she precisely describes the public records which are readily
available within the public agency.” KRS 61.872(3)(b) (emphasis added). Thus, a
person who does not live or work outside the county where the records are located is
not entitled to receive copies without having first inspected the records in person at
the facility provided by the agency. See Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 250 S.W.3d 655,
661 (Ky. 2008) (finding that “KRS 61.872(3)(b) seemingly applies when someone
residing outside the county in which the public records are located desires to receive
copies of the public records through the mail,” not a person “in the same county as
the records kept by the custodian”); see also 97-ORD-46 (finding that “[a] requester
who both lives and works in the same county where the public records are located
may be required to inspect the records prior to receiving copies”); 92-ORD-1620
(finding that KRS 61.872(3)(b) “reflects a concern that persons residing outside the
county where the records are maintained should not be compelled to travel great
distances in order to inspect those records”).
The City’s denial asserted that the Appellant resides or has his principal place
of business within Laurel County, where the record is located. In response, the
Appellant asserts that he no longer resides in Laurel County. Specifically, he states
that he “no longer live[s] at the address [the City] ha[s] on file.” On appeal, the City
maintains that the Appellant resides in Laurel County and argues that his statement
on appeal does not deny that assertion. Thus, a factual dispute exists between the
parties regarding whether the Appellant resided in Laurel County at the time of his
request.1
At bottom, the City asserts the Appellant resides in Laurel County, even as the
Appellant maintains he no longer lives in Laurel County. The Office has regularly
found it is unable to resolve factual disputes between the parties to an appeal under
KRS 61.880(2)(a). See, e.g., 22-ORD-219; 19-ORD-083; 03-ORD-061; OAG 89-81.
Thus, the Office cannot resolve the dispute between the parties regarding whether
the Appellant resided in Laurel County at the time of his request.
1
The Office notes that the record currently before it differs from the record in 25-ORD-124. That
appeal involved the same parties as this appeal. Addressing the same issue, the Office concluded that
the Appellant was a resident of Laurel County at the time his submitted his request because he
disclosed a Laurel County zip code where he lived in his request. Here, the Appellant did not state or
otherwise indicate that he was a resident of Laurel County at any point. Thus, the record before the
Office in this appeal presents a factual dispute as to this issue.A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court under KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days from
the date of this decision. Under KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall be notified
of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in
any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of the complaint
emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General
#183
Distributed to:
Bobby Ellison
Katelin McPeek, London City Clerk
Larry G. Bryson, London City Attorney
Randall Weddle, Mayor, City of London