25-ORD-128
May 16, 2025
In re: Channell Cole/Louisville Metro Police Department
Summary: The Louisville Metro Police Department (“the Department”)
subverted the intent of the Open Records Act (“the Act”), within the
meaning of KRS 61.880(4), when it delayed access to requested records
for over four months without proper justification.
Open Records Decision
On April 2, 2025, Channell Cole (“the Appellant”) submitted a request to the
Department for “[a]ll citations and police reports written at” a certain address on May
28, 2024. He also requested “[a]ll body camera and dash cam” for a two-hour period
from the same date and address. In response, the Department invoked KRS 61.872(5)
by stating it needed “additional time to gather [the Appellant’s] request” because it
“[r]equires a search for electronic records,” it “[r]equires redactions of audio and
visual files,” and the records sought “contain a mixture of exempt and nonexempt
information.” The Department further asserted that “[s]everal videos were located
and [are] approximately 15 hours in length.” Finally, the Department stated the
records would be available “on or before close of business August 15, 2025.” This
appeal followed.
Upon receiving a request to inspect records, a public agency must decide within
five business days whether to grant or deny the request. KRS 61.880(1). A public
agency may delay access to responsive records beyond five business days if such
records are “in active use, storage, or not otherwise available.” KRS 61.872(5). A
public agency that invokes KRS 61.872(5) to delay access to responsive records must
also notify the requester of the earliest date on which the records will be available
and provide a detailed explanation for the cause of the delay.
A requester who believes the agency’s delay is unreasonable may seek the
Attorney General’s review by alleging the agency subverted the intent of the Act by
“delay past the five (5) day period described in [KRS 61.880(1)].” KRS 61.880(4). In
determining how much delay is reasonable, the Office has considered the number ofrecords the requester has sought, the location of the records, and the content of the
records. See, e.g., 22-ORD-176; 01-ORD-140; OAG 92-117. Weighing these factors is
a fact-intensive analysis. See 21-ORD-045. Ultimately, the agency bears the burden
of proof to sustain its action. KRS 61.880(2)(c).
Here, the Appellant submitted a request to the Department, and in response,
the Department invoked KRS 61.872(5) to delay the Appellant’s access to the public
records for more than four months. On appeal, the Department asserts it has located
“22 potentially responsive videos totaling approximately 19 hours.” It further states
the process of reviewing and redacting video for confidential or personal information
takes about two hours for each hour of footage, which in this case “will amount to
about 40 hours of staff time,” or about one standard work week for one employee.
However, the Department claims it is reasonable to spend only two hours per week
on the Appellant’s request due to “the volume of records requests made to Louisville
Metro, and their obligation to comply timely with all of them.” At two hours per week,
the Department states it would require “nearly 20 weeks to complete the task.”
While many unrelated, simultaneous requests to inspect records may place a
strain on a public agency, “[n]either the volume of unrelated requests nor staffing
issues justifies a delayed response.” See 19-ORD-188 n.1; see also 25-ORD-013; 24-
ORD-063; 22-ORD-167. Here, the Department asserts no justification for a four-
month delay other than the volume of unrelated requests. Thus, the Department has
not met its burden under KRS 61.880(2)(c) to justify a delay of over four months to
respond to the Appellant’s request. Accordingly, the Department subverted the intent
of the Act, within the meaning if KRS 61.880(4), when it unreasonably delayed access
to records beyond the five-day period under KRS 61.880(1).
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to OAGAppeals@ky.gov.
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ James M. Herrick
James M. Herrick
Assistant Attorney General#165
Distributed to:
Channell Cole, Esq.
Donald J. Haas, Esq.
Anne Coorsen, Esq.
Nicole Pang, Esq.
Alice Lyon, Esq.
Annale R. Taylor, Esq.